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PORTRAITS OF RESISTANCE: LAWYER RESPONSES TO
UNJUST PROCEEDINGS
Alexandra D. Lahav
This Article considers a question rarely addressed: What is the role of the
lawyer in a manifestly unjust procedural regime? Many excellent studies have
considered the role of the judge in unjust regimes, but the lawyer's role has been
largely ignored. The analysis in this Article draws on two case studies: that of
lawyers representing civil rights leaders during protests in Alabama in the 1950s
and 1960s, and that of lawyers representing detainees facing proceedings before
the military commissions in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. These portraits illuminate
the strategies available to lawyers who face procedurally unjust tribunals operating
within a larger liberal legal regime such as our own.
The purpose of the Article is to paint a landscape of U.S. lawyer resistance to
procedural injustice that can be used as a basis for further inquiry. The Article
considers hard questions about lawyer participation in unjust tribunals, such as
whether lawyers who participate are complicit in injustice, and the consequences
to the client and to society of lawyer resistance to injustice. It demonstrates the
dualistic interplay between acts of resistance and complicity: Acts of resistance
may be coopted and perpetuate injustice, and acts that appear to be complicit can
result in powerful forms of resistance. It analyzes the forms and expressions of
resistance, and presents an original schema of the acts of resistance. The Article
also explores some questions raised by this analysis, such as what are the lawyer's
responsibilities to society and to the client, and whether lawyers can know when a
tribunal is so unjust as to merit resistance. The Article concludes by considering
avenues for further research.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 26, 2007, Joshua Dratel, a prominent New York criminal
defense attorney, stood before the military commission in Guant~namo Bay,
Cuba, for the last time.' His client David Hicks, a diminutive Australian
accused of providing material support for terrorism, was set to go to trial
shortly. Dratel had refused to sign a notice of appearance required by the
judge in order to continue appearing on his client's behalf. This notice
included a statement waiving the lawyer's right to contest any rules promul-
gated by the commission in the future, including rules promulgated for
the first time during trial. Before the courtroom packed with government
officials, human rights monitors, and journalists, Dratel told the court: "I
cannot sign a document that provides a blank check on my ethical obliga-
tions as a lawyer... ." The judge then disqualified him, and Dratel left the
1. Dratel's story is told in greater detail in Part I.B. 1, infra.
2. Transcript of Record at 27, United States v. Hicks, I.S.N. 0002 (Office of Military
Commissions, Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.miI/news/Mar2007JUS%20v%20
David%20Hicks%20ROT%20(Redacted).pdf [hereinafter Transcript of Record].
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room. A few days later Hicks pled guilty, and was returned to Australia to
serve a nine-month sentence.
Dratel faced the possibility that the system in which he was working was
a sham. The military commission system was not organized by a set of rules
known in advance, but instead by a set of seemingly ad hoc and ever-changing
regulations. The resulting unpredictability was further compounded by a bias
against the accused that was structured into the system. William Haynes,
Chief Counsel to the Department of Defense and legal advisor to the military
commissions, reportedly told Chief Prosecutor Morris Davis, the man who
prosecuted the Hicks case: "We can't have acquittals! We've got to have
convictions! If we've been holding these guys for so long, how can we explain
letting them get off?" Dratel was asked to choose between signing a statement
agreeing to a system that he believed violated basic prerequisites of the rule of
law and abandoning his client to face the tribunal without his help.
Dratel's moral crisis reflects the competing claims on a lawyer: the duty
to zealously advocate for one's client and fidelity to the rule of law. Here,
where Dratel was faced with a tribunal that he believed to be unjust, the crisis
was more complex. This story offers us an opportunity to ask questions that we
often ignore-questions about the limits of lawyers' duties to clients and to
the rule of law, and about the lawyer's role in maintaining or undermining
the legal system.
Guantdnamo is likely closing.5 As the Obama administration decides
how to try detainees, the issues raised by the military commissions are more
relevant than ever. The military commissions system has been considered by
many to be an extreme example of injustice, a literal outlier based not only
on its geographic location outside the United States but also on the U.S.
government's avowed refusal to permit application of constitutional princi-
ples to the trials conducted there.
3. Sarah Wood, Judge Accepts Australian Detainee's Guilty Plea, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE,
Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32642.
4. See Jane Mayer, The Battle for a Country's Soul, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, at 41-42.
The comment is attributed to Mr. Haynes by Colonel Morris Davis, the former chief prosecutor of
the military commissions, in response to Colonel Davis's statement that some acquittals would prove
that the tribunals were fair.
5. An executive order issued on January 22, 2009, temporarily halted prosecutions by mili-
tary commission and ordered closure of the Guantlinamo detention center within one year. Exec.
Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). However, the Obama Administration has did
not meet this deadline. See Charlie Savage, Plan to Move Guantanamo Detainees Faces New Delay,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at Al. While the president has not ruled out trying some cases by
military commission, the administration has transferred some cases to federal court. See Charlie
Savage, Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in NY, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at Al.
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Extreme examples such as Guant~hamo are important to study because
our history has been marked by legal regimes now universally recognized as
unjust, such as tribunals constituted under the Fugitive Slave Act6 and de jure
segregation. Moreover, such extreme examples may enable us to consider
questions lawyers face when using the strategies described here to resist injus-
tice in ordinary practice. What is the lawyer's responsibility when confronted
with injustice in the system? What is the significance of using one strategy of
resistance rather than another?
We do not know how often lawyers face the reality that the system they
are working in is a sham. As members of the legal profession, we tend not to
entertain or openly discuss the illegitimacy of legal processes. Lawyers may
complain that a particular judge was biased or the results of a particular trial
unfair, but these are understood as isolated problems, fundamentally different
from the allegation that an entire legal system is corrupt. Even so, such accu-
sations raise the specter of fundamental injustice and only appear isolated
because we believe that on a systemic basis, the system is just. But this eval-
uation, too, is a question of judgment and a subject of dispute.'
Surprisingly, the question of lawyer resistance to and complicity in unjust
tribunals has not been the subject of sustained study.' This Article is the first
6. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864).
7. For example, the civilian criminal justice system in the United States today can be
accused of harboring fundamental injustice. In 2007, the bead of the Capital Defender Service of the
state of Georgia resigned to protest budget cuts that he said made it impossible to fairly represent his
clients. "The old adage 'you get what you pay for' is particularly true with regard to the defense of
capital cases," he told the press, "which involve the greatest responsibility and most difficult assign-
ment that any lawyer is asked to undertake." Associated Press, Top State Defender Quits: Death
Penalty Lawyer Calls Cases' Funding "Grossly Inadequate," AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 1, 2007, at B6; see
also Brenda Goodman, Official Quits in Georgia Public Defender Budget Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2007, at A18. For a scholarly argument about the effects of resource inequality on procedural faimess,
see Alan Wertheimer, The Equalization of Legal Resources, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303 (1988). The
problems of how lawyers are to distinguish between isolated and systemic injustice, and what type of
resistance is appropriate to what level of injustice, are beyond the scope of this Article.
8. Thoughtful recent scholarship on lawyer participation in the military commission process
has considered lawyer resistance only as a local phenomenon, and largely ignored the question of
complicity. See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantdnamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1683 (2009) (discussing and critiquing rights-based strategies of internal resis-
tance adopted by the author in his own work); Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems?
The Case of the Military Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005) (advocating a
lawyer boycott of the military commissions as then constituted); David Luban, Lasfare and Legal
Ethics in Guantdnamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (2008) (arguing that, in the context of the military
commissions, the lawyer's role as zealous advocate is necessary to uphold human dignity of those
imprisoned in Guantdnamo Bay); Peter Margulies, The Detainees' Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of
Advocacy Strategies in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REv. 347 (2009) (describing out-of-court
advocacy strategies). Lawyer resistance has been given some consideration in the international context.
See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
APARTHEID, 1980-1994, at 549 (1995) (arguing in favor of lawyer resistance to the Apartheid regime
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analysis of lawyer responses to unjust tribunals focusing on the American
historical experience. It draws on two episodes from our history to examine
the difficulties lawyers face when asked to participate in procedurally unjust
tribunals. It further presents a map that will help the reader understand the
options available to lawyers in these situations and the consequences of par-
ticular choices. Although the Article focuses on the lawyer's dilemma as
experienced by defense counsel, the analysis applies equally to lawyers on both
sides of the "v."-both when injustice furthers the client's goals and when it
harms the client.9
The goal of the Article is to make room for the possibility of various
answers to the problem of the unjust tribunal. I proceed from the position
that if there were a right answer to the lawyer's dilemma of what to do in the
face of unjust proceedings, it would not be a true dilemma.'" Nonetheless,
the identification of available choices and of factors that influence their
consequences may aid lawyers in their decisionmaking.
My main contribution is to provide the first systematic look at types of
attorney resistance to manifest procedural injustice, an undertaking that can
form the basis of further inquiry. In the process, the Article makes two nor-
mative claims. First, it is possible for the lawyer to be degraded by participation
in an unjust tribunal. Lawyers may be complicit in the conduct of unjust
tribunals because their participation makes an adversarial proceeding possible.
Second, recourse to the lawyer's professional role does not resolve the dilemma
of the lawyer facing an unjust tribunal. Even if the lawyer concludes that the
in South Africa through litigation); DEMOCRACY AND THE JUDICIARY (Hugh Corder ed., 1989)
(providing an intriguing series of articles written by practicing lawyers in Apartheid South Africa);
Stephen Ellman, Law and Legitimacy in South Africa, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 407 (1995) (discussing
lawyers in the South African legal system); John Leubsdorf, Gandhi's Legal Ethics, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 923 (1999) (discussing Gandhi's approach to lawyering in the South African and Indian legal
systems). Lawyer complicity in Vichy France is also the subject of an excellent study. See RICHARD
H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996). Lawyer complicity in unjust
tribunals inside the United States has been completely ignored in scholarship, although the legal
implications of lawyer complicity have been considered in the context of the torture debate. See
Christopher Kutz, The Lawyers Know Sin: Complicity in Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA
241 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD'S MEMO AND
THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008).
9. The dilemma was similar for prosecutors and defense attorneys in the military commissions
system, for example. For another example of a case where the lawyer for the state ought to have considered
the effects of his participation in an unjust tribunal, see Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1980) (holding that denial of counsel in parental rights-termination hearing does not violate due process).
10. The nature of a moral dilemma is that it forces a person to choose between two courses of
action, both of which are wrong. If it were resolvable by recourse to a higher principle, it would not
be a moral dilemma. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 160, 161-62 (1973).
regime is unjust and resistance is required, acts of resistance still may leave
the lawyer open to allegations of complicity.
Part I sets the stage with two portraits of resistance. The first portrait is
of lawyers and leaders in the civil rights movement during two critical trials of
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.: one for criminal contempt before a moderate
segregationist judge in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, and another for
participation in the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955. The second portrait
is of lawyers representing Guantinamo detainees facing trial before military
commissions in 2007 and 2008. In these instances, lawyers faced tribunals
they believed to be unjust within an otherwise liberal legal regime. The
lawyers' stories provide the foundation for the discussion in the remainder of
the Article.
Part II interrogates understandings of lawyer complicity and resistance to
injustice and demonstrates the dualistic interplay between these two responses.
Acts of apparent resistance can be understood as complicit in the unjust
tribunal, and acts appearing to be complicit can result in powerful forms of
resistance. I also describe in detail the forms of resistance (exit and voice)
and the expressions of resistance (internal and external). I then present a new
schema of acts of lawyer resistance to procedural injustice: (1) collective boycott;
(2) individual refusal to participate; (3) using legal argument within the tribu-
nal (or "using the master's tools to dismantle the master's house""); (4) making
a record for a higher tribunal; and (5) appealing to public opinion. None of
these is a perfect solution to the lawyer's dilemma; each risks upholding the
procedural status quo, and each leaves potential clients in jeopardy.
Part III considers some questions raised by this analysis. First, to what
extent does recourse to the lawyer's professional role help in resolving the
lawyer's crisis before the unjust tribunal? I argue that our current understanding
of the lawyer's role does not dictate a particular approach to the question of
what lawyers should do when facing what they perceive to be unjust systems.
Yet this uncertainty does not make their choices any less important to the
amelioration of injustice. Second, how is the lawyer to know when a tribunal
is sufficiently unjust to merit resistance? Here, I recognize that procedural jus-
tice is a contested concept and, while not attempting in this short space to
provide a complete theory of procedural justice, make the pragmatic argument
that lawyers must make their own determinations about when resistance is
required. Complicating things further, because law is dynamic, the lawyer's own
actions may alter the legal landscape, contributing to injustice or preventing
11. See AUDRE LORDE, The Master's TooLs Will Never Disnmtle the Master's House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110, 110-13 (1984).
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it. As a result, lawyers' choices of the form that their resistance will take are
critical to shaping the law. At the same time, lawyers' choices are also con-
strained by the context in which they are working: lawyers must make hard
choices without knowing in advance whether they are on the side of history.
The Article concludes by explaining that the issue of lawyer resistance
to unjust tribunals is an important one for lawyers and future lawyers to con-
sider more deeply because unjust tribunals are certain to reappear. It lays the
groundwork for further research on lawyer responses to unjust proceedings,
shedding light not only on the extreme situation of the manifestly unjust tri-
bunal, but also on the role of the lawyer in our legal system more generally.
I. Two PORTRAITS OF RESISTANCE
American history is full of stories of lawyers resisting injustice. The
lawyers who defended alleged slaves facing return to slavery under the
Fugitive Slave Act 2 and who tried to prevent their exportation to the South
resisted an unjust procedural regime (as well as the substantive injustice of
slavery). 3 Similarly, lawyers who represented socialists and anarchists in the
early decades of the twentieth century, and communists in the middle of
the century, represented their clients in tribunals they believed were unjust. 4
This Article tells two such stories. The first is the story of the lawyers
who represented Martin Luther King Jr. in a criminal contempt trial in
Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963, and in his 1955 trial arising out of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott-both during the height of protests against segre-
gation. The second is the account of some of the lawyers who represented
persons detained as part of the "War on Terror" and tried before military
commissions in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba. The clients are different and the his-
torical and legal contexts distinct, but both raise the same question: What can
lawyers do when asked to participate in adversarial proceedings they believe to
be a sham?
12. Fugitive Slave Act, ch. 60,9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864).
13. That regime permitted an ex parte determination of the individual's status by a com-
missioner, explicitly excluded the accused's testimony from the proceeding, and entitled the
commissioner to a ten-dollar fee if he issued a certificate of removal, but only a five-dollar fee if he
denied the certificate. See id.; see aLso ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 175 (1975).
14. See, e.g., ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY'S PRISONER: EUGENE V. DEBS, THE GREAT
WAR, AND THE RIGHT TO DISSENT (2008); Rebecca Roiphe, Lauryering at the Extremes: The
Representation of Tom Mooney, 1916-1939, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731 (2009).
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A. The Trials of Dr. King
Martin Luther King Jr. was tried at least twice as a result of his participa-
tion in protests against segregation in Alabama. This subpart tells the story of
two trials. The first is Dr. King's trial for criminal contempt for protesting
segregation in Birmingham, Alabama, in April, 1963, in defiance of an injunc-
tion. The second is his trial for violating an Alabama state law prohibiting
boycotts on account of his leadership in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955.
Both trials arose from among the most famous protests of the civil rights
movement.
1. Walker v. City of Birmingham
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. came to Birmingham, Alabama, in April,
1963, to march against segregation.15 The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference (SCLC) had planned a significant protest in Birmingham for
April and intended to march on Good Friday for symbolic reasons. The
SCLC sought a permit to march, but was summarily denied by Eugene "Bull"
Connor, a militant segregationist and member of the Birmingham City
Council.'6 Aware of the SCLC's plans, lawyers for the City of Birmingham
sought and received an ex parte injunction barring any such demonstration.
The Alabama rules of procedure did not require that the demonstrators re-
ceive notice in advance of the hearing."
When the leaders of the SCLC were served with the injunction, they had
to decide their next step. Their decision was complicated by the movement's
insistence that governments in Jim Crow states comply with the federal
court injunction in Brown v. Board of Education.'8 This position, some felt,
required obedience to the rulings of state courts as well. Others thought that
there was no reason to fight the injunction in the Alabama court, because
they could never prevail before a Southern state court judge. Martin Luther
King, by contrast, was more conflicted. As Bayard Rustin recalled some
time later:
15. The source of the facts below (unless otherwise noted) is ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY
MAHONEY, THE TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING (1974). See also David Luban, Difference Made
Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2152 (1989).
16. Connor told Lola Hendricks, who applied for a permit on behalf of the movement: "No,
you will not get a permit in Birmingham, Alabama, to picket. I will picket you over to the City Jail."
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 122; see also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,
317 n.9 (1967) (quoting Hendricks's testimony).
17. 7 ALA. CODE § 1054 (LexisNexis 1960).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 74-75.
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[King] agreed in the planning session that the courts would be against
us, as they always had been in the South. But he would say, "Not
every judge will issue an injunction; we can't assume that." And Fred
Shuttlesworth answered him, "Where are those converted judges?
Where did niggers ever move and law was not used to beat our heads,
with judges helping?" "Well," King would repeat, "we can't take that
for granted." He really believed sacrifice and cheerful acceptance
might lead some judges to be moral.' 9
Norman Amaker, the NAACP lawyer sent from New York to attend to the
situation, reviewed the injunction and concluded that the only legal avenue
was to challenge the injunction in Alabama state court, where the civil rights
leaders were unlikely to obtain a fair hearing. The SCLC and its lawyers
never seriously discussed seeking relief before the Good Friday march, because
both considered it a practical impossibility. Moreover, postponing the week-
end marches was seen as politically unacceptable. ° Instead, Amaker briefed
his clients on the legal situation:
I tried to make clear to them what the situation was: if they did march,
they would probably be in violation of the injunction .... Even
though [the injunction] might be unconstitutional, though, the leaders
might be convicted for violating it .... I said that whatever they
decided to do-and that was their decision-we would try to find the
best possible way of supporting their actions in the courts. 2'
Amaker's view was similar to King's: the process might not yield results, but
still they would proceed through the courts. Amaker assumed that the SCLC's
lawyers would act solely through the courts.2 As the analysis below will
show, this was not the only option. The lawyers might have refused to partici-
pate in the state court proceedings, for example, or they might have harnessed
the press to try the Alabama judiciary in the court of public opinion.
Dr. King was among those arrested at the march for violating the injunc-
tion, and the Alabama judge who had issued it tried him for contempt. The
lawyers, King, and the SCLC considered a variety of tactics, but not partici-
pating in the trial was not one of them. This was not because they believed
that they would receive a fair hearing. Rather, they hoped to reach the more
neutral federal courts on appeal. But to get there, they had to defend the
19. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 62.
20. Id. at 80.
21. Id. at81.
22. See id.
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contempt charges in state court, where most believed they would lose regardless
of the merits, in order to make a record for the federal court to review."
The lawyers and their clients faced another difficult choice: whether to
try the Southern state courts in the court of public opinion-that is, whether
to draw popular attention to the injustice in the Southern state courts at the
contempt hearing. They decided not to do this for strategic reasons. The con-
tempt hearing was held while protests in Birmingham were ongoing. To turn
the hearing, unfair as it was, into a public spectacle would distract from the
purpose of the protests. The SCLC wanted the focus to be on the injustices
of segregation in the City of Birmingham, not on the injustices wrought by
Southern state courts.24 The civil rights leaders sought to focus energies on
protesting the substantively unjust laws, rather than the procedurally unjust
tribunal. But that meant that the SCLC's lawyers were required to litigate
the case before a biased court as though their client could receive a fair
hearing, despite knowing the case was lost before it began. The lawyers par-
ticipated in a proceeding they believed to be a sham to help their client
achieve his larger goals.
After trial, the Alabama state court judge convicted King of criminal
contempt for violating the injunction. King served his five-day sentence in
Birmingham city jail, during which time he wrote one of his most memorable
works, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail." 5 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
King's conviction, although in a separate case it found that the ordinance
authorizing the injunction was unconstitutional.26 In Walker v. City of
Birmingham,27 the Court upheld King's conviction for contempt on the grounds
that the Alabama court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction, and that the
place to dispute its constitutionality was in a suit to lift the injunction, not
after its violation (a rule known as the collateral bar rule).28 The Court offered
one olive branch to the petitioners. It noted that "[tihis case would arise in
quite a different constitutional posture if the petitioners, before disobeying
the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met
with delay or frustration of their constitutional claims."29  The Court's
decision ignored the injustice that resulted both from the procedural rules
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id.
25. Luban, supra note 15, at 2163-64.
26. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967) (affirming the conviction);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 159 (1969) (holding the ordinance on which
the injunction was based to be unconstitutional).
27. 388 U.S. 307.
28. Id. at 318 -21.
29. Id. at 318.
that permitted ex parte hearings without requiring notice to the other side,
and from the fact that the judge overseeing the case, a moderate segregationist,
was likely not a neutral arbiter. Had the petitioners sought to challenge the
injunction in the Alabama courts prior to the marches, they almost certainly
would have lost the case, as well as precious time and momentum. Thus,
although the Alabama court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction as a formal
matter, everything about its order betrayed a fundamental injustice that could
have served as justification for an exception to the collateral bar rule without
diminishing the power of the courts as a general matter?0
2. The Montgomery Bus Boycott Trial
King had faced a similar trial in March, 1955, during the Montgomery
Bus Boycott. He was indicted under a state law that prohibited "conspiring
'without just cause or legal excuse' to hinder a business."31 The case was tried
before a segregationist judge and, to no one's surprise, King was convicted. In
his legal history of this trial, Randall Kennedy explains that, nevertheless, the
conduct of the trial was a victory. Black lawyers were able to confront White
lawyers directly in an adversarial environment, were treated with (some)
respect, and matched, or even outshined, their White counterparts." Further-
more, the trial aired Black grievances about racially motivated mistreatment
on buses, including insults and incidents of degrading treatment, that were
otherwise hidden from the view of the White population." Thus, Kennedy
argues, trial testimony by Black citizens "eroded the myth of symmetry that
had long sustained the separate but equal doctrine. 34 This testimony was
part of a strategy to try the bus company in the court of public opinion.
However, as in the contempt trial in Birmingham seven years later, the law-
yers in Montgomery did not put the injustices of the court itself on trial.
Kennedy describes another strategy employed at the trial that raises
more troubling questions. King's lawyers argued that the boycott was not a
concerted action, but rather a series of simultaneous individual decisions.3" This
representation was simply not true. The boycott was in fact an orchestrated
30. See Martha Minow, Politics and Procedure, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 79,83-84 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
31. Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1029 (1989) (quoting ALA. CODE § 54, tit. 14 (1940) (presently codified
as ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-122 (LexisNexis 1975))).
32. Id. at 1034.
33. Id. at 1032-33.
34. Id. at 1034.
35. Id. at 1035.
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action. The problem with this strategy, then, was that it required lying to the
tribunal. Kennedy explains:
This raises the thorny question whether, or to what extent, King and
his allies owed a moral obligation of truthfulness to institutions that
oppressed them. Lying would seem to pose something of a quandary
for a protest that derived much of its inner and outer strength from its
sense of moral purity. Furthermore, given that King's conviction was
virtually certain no matter how he portrayed his role in the protest,
the question arises why he adopted a position at trial so at odds with the
candid defiance and plain-spoken eloquence that had helped to make
the boycott the extraordinary event it had become. Perhaps he deemed
evasion necessary to protect participants in the protest; to have been
open and forthright on the witness stand might have risked exposing
vulnerable people to extra-legal retribution. Perhaps, if pressed, King
would also have noted that he was being tried, after all, in a court that
lacked basic elements of justice.36
The knowing introduction of perjured testimony at a trial is a violation
of the ethical rules governing lawyers' conduct.37 But beyond that clear prohi-
bition lurk more troubling questions. Kennedy frames the issue as the extent
of an individual's moral duty to follow otherwise legitimate rules when faced
with gross injustice. This is an important question, and it raises another: To
what extent does the act of participating in an unjust adversarial proceeding
invite immoral or unethical conduct by participants?
B. The U.S. Military Commissions in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba
The U.S. government's use of military commissions to try detainees held
in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, spurred substantial resistance from members of
the U.S. legal community who believed the commissions to be deeply flawed."
36. Id. at 1035-36.
37. For the modem version of the ethical violation, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 3.3 (2002) (stating that a lawyer "shall not knowingly... offer evidence that the lawyer knows to
be false"). Subornation of perjury is also a crime. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (West 2009)
("Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
38. Numerous useful academic studies and popular books have described the flaws of these
commissions. See, e.g., JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER (2007); MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD
KNOW (2004); CLIvE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT O'CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE:
FIGHTING THE LAWLESS WORLD OF GUANTANAMO BAY (2007); BENJAMIN WITrES, LAW AND
THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2008); David W. Glazier,
Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal: Judging the 21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REV.
2005 (2003); David W. Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the
This subpart provides a brief overview to set the stage for understanding the
difficult issues that lawyers representing the accused before these commissions
have faced, followed by the stories of two trials of detainees under the military
commission system.
The military commissions were created by a Presidential Military Order
issued in November, 200129 Both civilian and military lawyers participated
in the system. From the beginning, the Department of Defense faced accusa-
tions that the military commissions failed to meet fundamental rule-of-law
requirements: the decisionmakers were not neutral; rules were created ad hoc
rather than set in advance; ex post facto laws were permitted; defense lawyers
were unable to adequately represent their clients; access to evidence was lim-
ited; and evidence tainted by coercion (even torture) could be introduced
at trial.' After the Supreme Court invalidated the commissions in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld,4  Congress reinstated them with the Military Commissions Act
of 2006.42 The new legislation solved some of the problems, but others
remained.43 For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that lawyers repre-
senting the accused were justified in their evaluation that the tribunals
continued to be procedurally unjust.
The first two cases tried under the military commissions system were
those of David Hicks and Salim Hamdan.4 Hicks was captured in Afghanistan
while fighting with the Taliban and charged with providing material support
for terrorism.45 His case ended in a guilty plea in 2007 that was widely reported
Guantnamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 131 (2008) [hereinafter Glazier, Self-
Inflicted Wound]; Luban, supra note 8; Richard J. Wilson, Military Commissions in Guantdnamo Bay:
Giving 'Full and Fair Trial' a Bad Name, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 63 (2006). For defenses of the military
commissions, see KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS
(2008) (providing a defense of the system written by a participating JAG lawyer); Frederic L. Borch
Ill, Why Military Commissions Are the Proper Forum and Why Terrorists Will Have "Full and Fair"
Trials: A Rebuttal to Military Commissions: Trying American Justice, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2003, at 10
(providing a defense of the system written by the Chief Prosecutor).
39. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
40. Glazier, Self-Inflicted Wound, supra note 38, at 185-94.
41. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
42. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948-950 (West 2008).
43. See Glazier, Self-Inflicted Wound, supra note 38 (evaluating changes in military commissions).
44. A third case, that of Ali Hamza al-Bahlul, was tried in October 2008, and a verdict was
rendered on November 3, 2008. See William Glaberson, Detainee Convicted on Terrorism Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at A17.
45. See Raymond Bonner, Australian Detainee's Life of Wandering Ends With Plea Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2007, at A17.
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to have been reached in response to pressure from the Australian government.'
Hicks served a nine-month sentence in confinement; the remainder of his
seven-year sentence was suspended. He served his sentence in his native
Australia." As part of the plea agreement, he agreed not to speak publicly
about his experiences at Guantinamo for a period of one year."
Hamdan had been Osama bin Laden's driver and, like Hicks, was cap-
tured in Afghanistan.49 He was tried and convicted of providing material
support for a terrorist organization and was sentenced to five-and-a-half
years in prison, the majority of which he had already served. 0 Initially, the
Department of Defense did not commit to releasing Hamdan at the end of his
sentence." However, several months after his conviction he was released to
the Yemeni government."
1. The Case of David Hicks
In August of 2003, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) issued an advisory ethics opinion stating: "[It is unethical for a
criminal defense lawyer to represent a person accused before these military com-
missions because the conditions imposed upon defense counsel before these
commissions make it impossible for counsel to provide adequate or ethical
representation."5 The terms imposed on defense counsel as a condition of
appearing before the commissions included government monitoring of attorney-
client communications; a prohibition on requests for adjournments; limited
access to information; a prohibition on sharing even unclassified information
with experts; and waiver of counsel's right to protest closed proceedings. 4
46. See, e.g., Scott Horton, The Plea Bargain of David Hicks, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 4, 2007,
available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/04/horton-plea-bargain-hicks; Paul Maley, Cheney
'Struck Hicks Deal' With PM, AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 24, 2007.
47. Sara Wood, Australian Detainee Sentenced to Nine Months, AM. FOREIGN PRESS SERVICE,
Mar. 30, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mi/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32657.
48. See Ben Wizner, Tribunals of the Absurd, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at A23.
49. See William Glaberson, Two Sides at Guantdawmo Paint Starkly Different Pictures of
Defendant, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A17.
50. See William Glaberson, Panel Sentences Bin Laden Driver to a Short Term, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2008, at Al.
51. See William Glaberson, A Conviction, but a System Still on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2008, at A27.
52. Robert F. Worth, Bin Laden Driver to Be Sent to Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/1 l/26/washington/26gitmo.htm.
53. NACDL Ethics Advisory Comm., Opinion 03-04 (2003).
54. See Dep't of Def. Military Comm'n Instruction No. 5 on the Quality of Civilian Defense
Counsel, Annex B (April 30, 2003) (on file with author) (setting forth limitations on civilian coun-
sel as a condition of representation).
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Joshua Dratel, the civilian criminal defense attorney described at the
beginning of this Article, used the NACDL ethics opinion to negotiate better
conditions for his representation of David Hicks. He relied on the opinion
to convince Brigadier General Thomas Hemingway, Legal Adviser to the
Convening Authority in the Department of Defense Office of Military Com-
missions, to permit Dratel to converse with his client free from monitoring;
to leave Guantdnamo while the case was ongoing; to seek discretionary adjourn-
ments just as in ordinary courts; to consult with experts outside the defense
team on unclassified information; and to contest closed proceedings. With
some of his concerns assuaged, Dratel agreed to represent Hicks before the
commission."
This success was not to last. In 2007, the presiding officer of Hicks's
commission asked Dratel to sign a notice of appearance, in order to partici-
pate in the commissions newly convened pursuant to Congress's 2006 Act. 6
This new notice was promulgated by the presiding officer and required Dratel
to agree to abide by all the commission's rules." Since many of those rules
were not yet written, Dratel was concerned that the government would institute
provisions similar to those he had objected to in 2003, and that by signing
this notice of appearance, he would waive his right to contest those rules.
To solve this problem, Dratel added the words "presently existing" to the
notice so that instead of providing that he agreed to "all applicable regulations,"
it stated only that he agreed to "all presently existing applicable regula-
tions." 8 The presiding officer refused to accept the notice of appearance as
altered, warning Dratel that he should sign the notice as written or be
disqualified. The presiding officer then held a conference before Dratel
arrived at the base and without the defendant present to determine whether
Dratel should be disqualified for refusing to sign the notice. Hicks and Dratel
were represented at the conference by assigned defense counsel Michael
"Dan" Mori.59
55. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Zealous Lawyering Succeeds Against All Odds: Major Mori and the
Team for David Hicks at Guandunamo Bay, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 469, 478-79 (2008); see
also Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 26.
56. Transcript of Record, supra note 2.
57. See id. at 30. The Military Commission regulations indicated that the notice was to be
promulgated by the Department of Defense, not the officers serving on the military commissions.
Dratel's objection on this basis was dismissed by the Presiding Officer. See id.
58. U.S. v. David Hicks, Civilian Defense Counsel Notice of Appearance and Agreement
(Mar. 21, 2007) (emphasis added).
59. Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 9.
At the public hearing, held after the conference described above, the
presiding officer officially disqualified Dratel. Dratel explained to the commission
(and to the public) his reasoning for refusing to sign the notice of appearance:
I cannot sign a document that provides a blank check on my ethical
obligations as a lawyer, my ethical obligations to my client, my ethi-
cal obligations under the rules of professional responsibility for the
State of New York to which I am bound.
I cannot again buy a pig-in-a-poke in this process. These are the
same problems that plagued the previous commission; that everything
is ad hoc, that everything moves in a way where you cannot predict
from one day to the next what the rules are."
The presiding officer offered Dratel the opportunity to remain as a counselor
but without the ability to advocate before the tribunal on Hicks's behalf.
Dratel refused, stating: "[Y]ou don't have to ask Mr. Hicks about whether he
wants me here or not, I'm not going to pretend that I'm here functioning when
I'm not entitled to do my job."' Because his disqualification occurred on the
eve of the trial, and because it highlighted the lack of rules in the military
commission system, Dratel's actions received substantial media attention.
62
Hicks's lawyers had been successful in drawing public attention to his
case prior to trial as well. Mori, Hicks's detailed defense counsel, gave numer-
ous press conferences between the time Hicks was charged and when he pled
guilty. "I think they wanted us to be good little boys and wait for the trial
and make our objections so they could just go with the process," Mori told an
Australian news program in 2006. "But, you know, in a rigged system.., all
you can do sometimes is just to try to let people know what's going on and
why it's unfair.6'3 Mori traveled to Australia several times to advocate for Hicks
and to put pressure on the Australian government to negotiate his release. 6
While publicizing Hicks's case, Mori made numerous statements using
strong language to describe the unfairness of the tribunals. At one point,
the commissions' chief prosecutor accused Mori of violating Article 88 of the
60. Id. at 26-27.
61. Id. at 29.
62. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Plea of Guilty From a Detainee in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2007, at Al.
63. ENOUGH ROPE With Andrew Denton (ABC1 television broadcast Aug. 14, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v+Jsw3Dx49NA.
64. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 55, at 482.
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Uniform Code of Military Justice," which makes it a crime for a military offi-
cer to use "contemptuous words" about the President, Vice President, Secretary
of Defense, or other high public officials.' When asked about this by reporters,
Mori responded in anger, asking, "Are they trying to intimidate me?, 67 In the
end, Mori's efforts spurred the plea deal that achieved his client's release in
the face of what might have been an indefinite detention.
2. The Case of Salim Hamdan
Salim Hamdan's lawyers were also successful in drawing public attention
to their client's case. Their greatest successes, however, came from the numer-
ous appeals they filed in the U.S. federal courts, one of which resulted in
the Supreme Court ruling that the military commissions, as constituted by the
Presidential Military Order in 2001,6 were unconstitutional.69 For Hamdan
and his lawyers, the great hope was the federal court system.
Indeed, even before Hamdan had been assigned a lawyer, Neil Katyal, a
Georgetown law professor now famous for his representation of Hamdan
before the Supreme Court, suggested to military defense counsel-who did
not yet have clients-that they file an amicus brief in the Supreme Court
case Rasul v. Bush.7" The case was to decide whether the federal courts had
habeas jurisdiction over noncitizen detainees held at Guantdnamo. 71 Katyal
first suggested that the military defense lawyers file a lawsuit on their own
behalf, arguing that "you shouldn't be made to participate in an unconstitu-
tional proceeding[;] ... doing so contradicts your oath to uphold the Constitu-
tion."72 The lawyers refused, arguing that without clients they could not file
any briefs.73 One of them explained: "My entire professional career I've worked
with the understanding that a defense counsel has no stake in any case
unless he represents a client with an interest, and I can't see a way around
that now. 74 In the end, the military defense lawyers agreed to file an amicus
65. See Raymond Bonner, Terror Case Prosecutor Assails Defense Lauryer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2007, at A10.
66. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2006).
67. Bonner, supra note 65.
68. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
69. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634-35 (2006).
70. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
71. Id. at 475.
72. JONATHAN MAHLER, THE CHALLENGE: HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD AND THE FIGHT OVER
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 67 (2008).
73. Id. at 68-69.
74. Id. at 69 (quoting Email from Lt. Cmdr. Philip Sundel to Neil Karyal).
brief that argued that nobody in the litigation was speaking for their future
clients-the only detainees that both parties agreed were not entitled to
immediate access to habeas corpus. 5 That amicus brief was the first in a
long series of appeals to the federal courts filed by Hamdan's defense counsel.
In Hamdan's case, lawyers experienced a tension between loyalty to
their client and loyalty to the integrity of the legal system. Like all detainees,
Hamdan was required to undergo a hearing before a Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT) to determine whether he was an unlawful com-
batant who could be held indefinitely. 6 In these hearings, detainees were
not permitted to have lawyers, but instead were appointed "personal repre-
sentatives" by the military to guide them through the hearing.77 Personal
representatives were not to provide legal advice. 8 Charles Swift, another
member of Hamdan's legal team, believed the CSRT proceedings to be sham
hearings in which the outcome was predetermined. He nevertheless asked
to be present as Hamdan's lawyer-a request that was denied. In order to attend
the hearing, Swift then asked to be called as a witness to testify about excul-
patory information he had gathered while investigating Hamdan's case.
Twenty-four hours before the CSRT hearing, Swift was informed that his
request had been granted.79
For personal reasons, and because he believed the CSRT hearing was a
charade, Swift ultimately decided not to attend the hearing. His testimony
would probably not have altered the finding that Hamdan was an unlawful
enemy combatant. Moreover, identifying himself as a potential witness in
Hamdan's trial could have disqualified Swift from serving as trial counsel.'
Nonetheless, his absence was devastating to his client. Hamdan demanded
of Swift: "Where were you? Why did you leave me?"' According to one report,
"Swift tried to explain that the hearings were a joke, the verdicts a forgone
conclusion, that at least the military commissions, with all their flaws, were
trying to pass themselves off as legitimate courts. The distinction was mean-
ingless to Hamdan."'
75. Id. at 69-71.
76. Id. at 153-54.
77. See Kristine A. Huskey, Standards and Procedures for Classifying "Enemy Combatants":
Congress, What Have You Done?, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 41, 47 (2007).
78. Id.
79. MAHLER, supra note 72, at 153.
80. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2002) (barring lawyers from acting as
advocates in trials where they would be necessary witnesses).
81. MAHLER, supra note 72, at 154.
82. Id.
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II. LAWYER COMPLICITY AND RESISTANCE
The role of the lawyer in unjust tribunals such as those described above
is seldom addressed in the scholarly literature.83 Meanwhile, the question of
judicial participation and complicity in unjust legal regimes has received much
more attention.4 This asymmetry likely results from the perception of judges as
protectors of the legal system, while lawyers are relegated to the role of adver-
sarial players within it. Yet lawyers play a critical role in protecting the legal
system by choosing when and how to litigate. As a result, lawyer resistance
can have powerful effects on legal systems.
Some literature suggests that submission and resistance represent oppo-
site poles of human behavior within organizational systems. As John Rawls
explained, "[tihe persistent and deliberate violation of the basic principles of
[the public conception of justice] over any extended period of time, especially
the infringement of the fundamental equal liberties, invites either submission
or resistance." 5 But the relationship between submission, complicity, and
resistance is more complex.' As the analysis below attempts to demonstrate,
acts that appear to resist can be coopted by an unjust regime, such as when
the presence of vociferous defense counsel in a rigged system is used as evi-
dence of that system's fairness. At the same time, acts that appear complicit
83. There have been some attempts to address this issue, but they are either incomplete or do
not address the American experience. Most of the scholarship on lawyers before unjust tribunals in
the U.S. concerns the military commissions specifically and is straightforwardly laudatory about acts
of resistance. See generally sources cited supra note 8 (describing studies of the military commissions).
There are more nuanced studies of lawyer resistance and complicity outside the U.S. For example,
WEISBERG, supra note 8, at 386-90, demonstrates that the interpretive approaches of French lawyers
under the Vichy regime increased injustices against Jews, and that less unjust interpretations were
available. This is a rather different instance of complicity from the incidents I discuss here, because
the lawyers did not resist injustice but rather submitted to it wholeheartedly. Weisberg provides a
sophisticated, contextually specific theory of why these lawyers chose submission over resistance. I
have found two studies addressing the relationship between complicity and resistance, both in the
South African context. The first is DEMOCRACY AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, a collection of
first person essays by lawyers practicing under the Apartheid regime. The second is STEPHEN
ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE OF EMERGENCY
253-70 (1992), a refutation of concerns about lawyer complicity.
84. See COVER, supra note 13, at 175-91 (analyzing the forms of legal reasoning marshaled by
judges who decided cases under the Fugitive Slave Act); DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN
WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 269-70
(1991) (arguing that the application of Ronald Dworkin's theory of law by South African judges
enabled them to ameliorate racially restrictive laws, whereas positivist theories did not).
85. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 365-66 (1971).
86. Several wonderful sociological studies explain the complex phenomenon of resistance.
See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE 183-87 (1998); JAMES C. ScoTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE:
HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (1990).
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can become powerful forms of resistance, as when participation produces facts
demonstrating injustice to higher authorities. The yin-yang relationship
between the concepts of complicity and resistance is critical to understanding
and evaluating the lawyer's choices when confronting an unjust tribunal.
This Part discusses the responsibility and moral agency of lawyers facing
unjust tribunals. The first subpart develops the concept of lawyer complicity
by demonstrating that lawyers may be complicit in unjust tribunals even
when they intend to resist injustice. The second subpart analyzes the concept
of resistance in the context of lawyer participation or nonparticipation in
unjust tribunals, laying out the forms of resistance and their expression within
and outside of the tribunal. The third subpart presents a novel schema of acts
of resistance available to lawyers, and examines the methods, justifications,
and drawbacks of each. This discussion of choices and consequences will set
the stage for a discussion of the lawyer's role and procedural justice in Part III.
A. Complicity
One intuitively appealing position is that the lawyer-particularly the
defense lawyer-bears no responsibility for the conduct of the unjust tribunal.
This is because the lawyer did not cause the judge to be biased, to admit
coerced testimony, or to do any other thing that resulted in injustice. Instead,
the defense lawyer intends to resist injustice and to protect the client's
individual rights. Robert Cover explained this position in his study of judicial
interpretation of the Fugitive Slave Act: "The attorney's role within a system of
law assumed to be immoral is much easier to justify than that of the judge.
The practical tasks of freeing alleged slaves and defending those accused of har-
boring fugitives were not often thought of as inconsistent with antislavery." 7
The dominant view of complicity is that it requires intent.' Under this
view, lawyers are complicit in the injustice of the tribunal only if they
intended the outcome.89 However, as I attempt to demonstrate, lawyers may
be complicit even though they do not intend to facilitate injustice-when
their participation lends the appearance of credibility to the unjust tribunal.
Consider the following story from the South African experience in the
late 1960s, recounted by lawyer Jules Browde:
87. COVER, supra note 13, at 159.
88. CHRISTOPHER Kurz, CoMPLicrIy: ETHICS AND LAw FOR A Cou.Ecr1vE AGE 122 (2000).
89. For example, the philosopher Christopher Kutz defines the "complicity principle" as fol-
lows: "I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or
the harm they cause." Id.
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I acted for two Black communities on the West Rand which had
brought an application for an interdict restraining the police from har-
assing them by various means in their townships. In opening the case,
I set out in broad terms the allegations which we intended to prove
and I enunciated the evidence that we proposed bringing in order to
substantiate those allegations. At the first tea break when I was still
addressing the Court in opening, I was approached by one of the spec-
tators, a visitor to South Africa, who introduced himself to me as Mr.
Griffin Bell, the Attorney General of the United States during the
Carter Administration. He told me that while he was horrified at
the allegations that were made against the police, he nevertheless was
impressed with the fact that these allegations could be aired in open
court. He assured me that South Africa was the only country on this
continent-and as he put it, I daresay on some other continents that I
could mention-in which this could take place. Unfortunately, that is
the last time I saw Mr. Griffin Bell and, consequently, I have been
unable to tell him that that case was ended by the declaration of the
state of emergency and the arrest and detention without trial of most
of the important witnesses for the applicants. 90
In this example, Browde was unintentionally complicit in the unjust tri-
bunal. His work on behalf of the Black plaintiffs lent credence to the South
African court because his participation created the appearance of a balanced
adversarial system in which grievances could be aired openly and both sides
heard. The adversarial system is central to the common law conception of
procedural justice. In our legal culture, adversarialism sends a signal of fair-
ness, particularly among the public that observes the system from afar. 9' The
presence of adversaries may hide the fact that the decisionmaker is not neutral
and cannot hear the other side. Thus, in this case, Browde lent respectability
to an unjust system simply by participating, even though he personally opposed
the very system in which he was complicit.92
Can lawyers be considered responsible for outcomes that they did not
intend, or for processes of which they disapprove? For lawyers who participate
in an unjust tribunal, even if they resist the tribunal in the course of par-
ticipation, the act of participation becomes a formative part of their personal
and professional identity. If participation lent credibility to the tribunal, that
is, if it made observers believe that the tribunal was fair, then the experience of
90. Jules Browde, The Role of Practising Lawyers Witin the Present Legal System, in DEMOCRACY
AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 8, at 77, 78.
91. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 79-80 (1997).
92. But see ELLMANN, supra note 83, at 264-65 (arguing that the role of lawyers did not
legitimate the South African system in the eyes of foreign observers).
having lent credibility to the tribunal becomes part of who those lawyers are.
They become the lawyers who made the tribunal appear to be fair when it was
not. Thus, lawyers who attempt to defend their clients against injustice, but
in the process create the appearance of fairness, can be held responsible.93
Good intentions do not absolve lawyers of responsibility. Even a defense
lawyer who objects to the tribunal in the course of participation may bear
some responsibility for lending credibility to injustice by simply participating. 94
Furthermore, participation itself, if taken seriously, may sully the moral
purity of the participants and may invite them to take positions and to play
tactical games against an unfair adversary that will likely, if not inevitably, lead
to some shameful conduct. The problem is that refusal to participate has grave
consequences as well, both for the lawyer and the client. This is especially true
if one holds out hope that reasoned argument may sway the tribunal.
Lawyers worry about lending credibility to unjust tribunals, demonstrat-
ing that the question of their responsibility is a live issue. Charles Swift, a
member of the team representing Salim Hamdan before the Guantdnamo
military commissions, explained: "We were concerned, that fighting would
serve to validate the system."'9  Another defense lawyer at Guantnamo stated:
"[Tihere are all these times that you throw up your hands and say that this is
impossible, it can never be fair, it's a sham, I'm participating in a charade,
I'm only adding to it, I'm only making it look like its real."'
Indeed, the work of defense lawyers on behalf of Guanttnamo detainees
was used to support the proposition that the military commissions were fair.
Responding to accusations of unfairness from a defense lawyer, the spokesman
for the Pentagon's tribunal office stated: "His job as defense counsel is to
zealously defend people who may be tried before military commissions. I expect
him to raise issues in his client's interest."'97 By invoking the principle of zealous
advocacy to describe the resisting lawyers' conduct, the spokesman commu-
nicated that the lawyers' protests were mere hyperbole or grandstanding, a
reflection of the lawyer's duty to provide zealous representation rather than
93. For a philosophical discussion of this idea, see MEIR DAN-COHEN, Responsibility and the
Boundaries of the Self, in HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF AND MORALITY 199, 204-05,
222 (2002).
94. As Dan-Cohen explains, "One bears collective responsibility even with respect to objects
and events toward which one has a negative attitude and despite one's efforts to prevent them. Indeed,
such efforts may be motivated precisely by the individual's awareness of the responsibility he or she will
ineluctably bear if the object or event materializes." Id. at 223.
95. William Glaberson, An Unlikely Antagonist in the Detainees' Comer, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2008, at Al.
96. Interview With Guantdnamo Bay Defense Lawyer (Sept. 2007) (transcript on file with author).
97. John Mintz, Lauryer Criticizes Rules for Tribunals, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2004, at A03.
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a considered assessment. Such statements tap into the general perception that
adversarial procedures are fair, and elide the other aspects of the tribunal
that undo the shield of adversarial representation.9
During and in the immediate aftermath of Hamdan's trial, supporters of
the military commissions similarly used the presence of defense counsel, and
specifically defense-counsel resistance, as proof that the trial was fair. Two
prominent Washington attorneys stated: "The real question, of course, is
whether Hamdan is getting due process, and whether his trial is fair. The
answer is yes. Hamdan has an able team of defense lawyers determined to
squeeze from the system every drop of procedural advantage." Even though
the presiding authority had held that Fifth Amendment due process did not
apply to the military commissions, its supporters pointed to the presence of
defense counsel and the implication of adversarialism as evidence that Hamdan
was receiving adequate process."O In sum, although defense lawyers may intend
for their actions to have one effect-resistance-their actions are trans-
formed into signals that the tribunal is credible and fair.
The presence of vociferous defense counsel is one indicia of the type
of formal, adversarial court proceedings that lend credibility to injustice. The
formal trappings of the courtroom may also lead to the illusion that justice is
being done. Consider the majority's refusal in Walker v. City of Birmingham"' to
face the reality of the political situation in Alabama. In affirming Martin Luther
King Jr.'s conviction for marching in violation of the Alabama state court
injunction, the Court considered only whether the state court had jurisdiction
to issue the injunction, not whether the injunction itself was constitu-
tional. 2 The existence of formal courtroom proceedings, including arguments
presented by both the protestors and the City, was sufficient for a majority of the
Court. Moreover, in requiring the civil rights marchers to have challenged
the constitutionality of the injunction in Alabama state court, the justices gave
no indication that they believed the state court would have offered anything
other than "orderly judicial review," despite strong evidence to the contrary."
98. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 45 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing the defense
counsel's zealous representation as a shield that was insufficient to render the proceedings just).
99. David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Justice at Gitmo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at A13.
100. See Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices
and on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Fifth Amendment, United States v. Hamdan (U.S.
Military Comm'n, July 20, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Ruling%20on%20
Motion%20to%2OSuppress%2029%20and%20D-044%2Ruling/o201%20(2).pdf.
101. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
102. Id. at 315.
103. Id. at 320. The majority supported its position by noting that White supremacists had been
subject to the same Alabama rule, the idea being that the rules were applied similarly to all groups,
notwithstanding the political context. Id. at 319-20. The court ignored the distinguishing facts that, in
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An equitable result can further diminish the power of the lawyer's
argument against the unjust procedure. The result is good for the client, but
perhaps less so for the legal institutions that have now entrenched unfair
processes by reaching acceptable results in individual cases despite systemic
injustice. For example, both David Hicks and Salim Hamdan were repre-
sented by defense counsel who strongly resisted injustices. Both defendants
received relatively short sentences, arguably without altering the basic injustices
of the system. As Morris Davis, the former Chief Prosecutor of the military
commissions explained: "[I]n the end losing may equate to winning.... If you
look at Hicks (9 months) and Hamdan (<6 months) it suggests the best way
to win at Gitmo is to lose."1"
Walker presents an interesting variation on this theme. The Supreme
Court on the one hand upheld the Alabama court's criminal contempt con-
viction against Dr. King and his compatriots. At the same time, in Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham,'5 the Court established that the ordinance authorizing
the injunction was unconstitutional. 6 The Shuttlesworth decision shored up
the Court's decision in Walker by demonstrating that the Court was capable
of recognizing some substantive injustice, even as it permitted the city of
Birmingham to prevail in the contempt action in the name of procedural justice.
So far this subpart has argued that lawyers may be responsible for lending
credibility to unjust tribunals. But holding lawyers responsible for unjust
tribunals may further undermine justice by discouraging lawyer resistance
through participation. This is the reason that the Rules of Professional
Conduct absolve lawyers of responsibility for their client's point of view.0 7 If
we retain the hope that lawyers can bend injustice through the various forms
of resistance described in the remainder of this analysis, then we will want
to free them of responsibility in order to encourage participation. However,
if we want lawyers to resist the tribunal, we must encourage a sense of profes-
sional responsibility not solely to clients within the confines of the tribunal, but
to the larger ideals of legality. Finally, stressing the lawyers' responsibility for
the normalization or acceptance of unjust procedures may encourage lawyers
Walker, the judge was a moderate segregationist and therefore likely biased against the civil rights
marchers, and that the marchers had not had an opportunity to be heard before the court issued the
injunction.
104. Posting of Morris Davis to Opinio Juris (Aug. 7, 2008, 8:19 AM EST), available at http://
opiniojuris.org/2008/08/07/why-hamdans-material-support-convictions-violate-the-ex-post-facto-clause.
105. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
106. Id. at 158-59 & n.7.
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002) ("A lawyer's representation of a
client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities.").
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to withdraw collectively and thereby stop the tribunal. These choices, and the
tensions they create, are discussed at greater length below.
B. Resistance
A lawyer facing an unjust tribunal may naturally consider whether and how
to resist injustice. Resistance comes in many forms and expressions. It can
involve speech or silence, participation or refusal to participate. It can come
from within the system or from outside. The following discussion illuminates
these different concepts. Two distinctions are fundamental to understanding
the concept of resistance and its manifestations. The first is the distinction
between two forms of resistance: voice and exit. This distinction encompasses
the decisions between speech and silence, and between participation and
refusal to participate. The second distinction is between internal and external
resistance. Lawyers resisting injustice can utilize the language and procedures
of the legal system that is being resisted (internal) or engage the world beyond
that system (external). The following discussion illuminates these concepts.
1. The Forms of Resistance: Exit and Voice
The two basic forms of resistance are exit and voice.10'8 Exit means refus-
ing to participate or deciding to leave the entity in question. Voice is exercised
by the communication of dissatisfaction or resistance. Although the categories
of exit and voice are simplistic, they provide a good starting point for under-
standing resistance. This subpart defines the concepts of exit and voice, and
explores ways in which they interact, overlap, and substitute for one another
in the context of unfair hearings.
Exit is a strategy for spurring change usually associated with economic
rather than political life."° The emblematic example of exit is the consumer's
decision to buy a product from a different manufacturer. "' Similarly, the law-
yer's right to refuse to represent a client or to withdraw from representation is
a function at least in part of the lawyer's autonomy as an economic actor.
The exercise of this economic liberty can harm others, such as by making it
108. Albert Hirschman developed these categories, as well as another concept, "loyalty," initially to
apply to firms or organizations in decline, but they are also useful for clarifying types of reactions to injustice
in the political sphere, including unjust tribunals. In Hirschman's view, management learns of failure either
because of a significant defection of consumers (exit) or expressions of dissatisfaction (voice). Loyalty
prevents consumers from leaving the firm and spurs the exercise of voice. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESFONSESTo DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES 4 (1970).
109. See id. at 4, 15-17.
110. Id. at 15.
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difficult to obtain legal representation or forcing clients to start over with a new
lawyer. To prevent the latter outcome, the Rules of Professional Conduct set
limits on a lawyer's ability to withdraw from representation.'' Examples of exit
include the NACDL's decision to advocate a boycott of the Guantdnamo
military commissions, and Joshua Dratel's decision to withdraw from repre-
sentation of David Hicks rather than sign a notice of appearance he felt
violated basic precepts of the rule of law." 2
Voice is the more articulate feedback mechanism. Voice involves an
attempt to "change, rather than escape from, an objectionable state of affairs"
through petition, appeal to a higher authority, protest, or other act of vocal
resistance." 3 The political realm exhibits a bias towards voice as a means of
registering discontent. Exit from the state is branded as defection, treason, or
desertion."' Exercising voice is also consistent with the lawyer's advocacy
role. Lawyers for Dr. King exercised voice when they participated in the
Montgomery bus boycott trial and when they appealed to the higher author-
ity of the federal courts after King's 1963 state court conviction."5 Dratel
negotiated with the convening authority of the military commissions directly
to change certain rules."6 Similarly, Dan Mori, another of Hicks's lawyers,
traveled to Australia in an attempt to reach the court of public opinion and
to spur the Australian government to assist his client."
7
Lawyers stand in complex relationship to the concepts of exit and voice,
in part because the lawyer-client relationship is both economic and political.
Lawyers provide a service, often for payment, which in turn gives their clients
access to justice. Because there is a market for legal representation, lawyers
traditionally retain the autonomy of exit, and exit is generally the preferred
strategy for lawyers unhappy with their clients' decisions. Yet the lawyer's
duty of loyalty to the client sometimes demands that the lawyer remain in the
client's employ."8 Furthermore, a lawyer who does not participate in the unjust
tribunal is not an advocate but a bystander.
Moreover, exit and voice are not mutually exclusive. First, they may be
used as alternatives to one another, or they may interact and overlap in a sin-
gle course of action. In situations in which exit is not available, voice becomes
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002).
112. See supra Part 1.B.1.
113. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 108, at 30.
114. See id. at 17.
115. See supra Part l.A.1.
116. See supra Part l.B.1.
117. See supra Part I.B.1.
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002) (setting limits on the lawyer's
ability to withdraw when withdrawal will harm the client).
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the means of registering discontent. Similarly, when voice is limited, exit
becomes the primary reaction. For example, lawyers fearing contempt sanc-
tions or even jail in retaliation for active resistance may decide not to
participate in unjust tribunals."9 In the military context, the exercise of voice
may result in the threat of substantial discipline, as Dan Mori experienced
when the prosecutor accused him of making statements that violated the
Uniform Code of Military Conduct during his representation of Hicks.'
Judge Advocate General lawyers do not have the unencumbered right to
withdraw from representation of their clients. Doing so without permission
would be to disobey orders. This inability to withdraw arguably spurs their
exercise of voice.1
2
'
Second, sometimes exit and voice interact and overlap in the same
course of action. Dratel's refusal to sign the notice of appearance that he
found objectionable was a form of protest (voice) which resulted in his dis-
qualification (exit). His further decision to leave the courtroom (exit) rather
than remain as a counselor not permitted to address the tribunal increased
the attention the press paid to his message. 2
Similarly, when the NACDL issued the ethics opinion urging civilian
criminal defense lawyers to boycott the military commissions, this constituted
a form of "exit with the promise of reentry."'2 The collective refusal was a
communicative act that bore more weight than exit undertaken on an indi-
vidual basis. The detail with which the opinion delineated the organization's
opposition to the military commission system demonstrated that the boycott
was intended to increase the volume of the organization's voice within the
larger political debate.
The concept of loyalty helps to elucidate the functioning of exit and
voice in legal representation. People who are loyal will seek to make themselves
more influential in an organization, and people who hold power in an
organization are more likely to be loyal.' Having some loyal participants
119. Lawyers can be sanctioned for their courtroom conduct. See In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813,
821 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding a contempt charge against trial counsel). See generally Pnina Lahav,
Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago Conspiracy TriaL, 16 LAW & LIT. 381, 389-90 (2005).
120. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (describing Mori's publicity campaign in
Australia and its repercussions).
121. See Luban, supra note 8, at 2011 (describing the potential consequences of a JAG defense
lawyer's decision to disobey a judge's order in a military commission proceeding).
122. For Dratel, withdrawing meant abandoning his client to face the tribunal without him.
The fact that Hicks had already reached a plea deal mitigates the wrong that Dratel committed
towards his client, but one can imagine a situation in which a lawyer would follow the same course of
action even though the trial was set to go forward.
123. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 108, at 86; see NACDL Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 53.
124. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 108, at 78.
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prevents "deterioration from becoming cumulative" so that the organization
has an opportunity to improve its functioning.'25 Loyalists may use the threat
of exit as a means of increasing the power of their voices.' 26 Ease of exit can
affect the development of loyalty, by making it more difficult for members
to gain power within the organization. This is because it is simpler to evade or
postpone change when exit is free and easy.1
27
Attorney loyalty can operate on several levels. It can include loyalty to
the individual client, loyalty to a particular conception of the professional
role, and loyalty to legal institutions and to the liberal legal regime. For
example, the lawyers representing King were arguably loyal both to the client,
who wanted to participate in the contempt proceeding, and to the ideal of
the pursuit of justice in the federal courts, which they hoped would be able to
fairly resolve the case. Military lawyers appearing before the military commis-
sions were arguably loyal to the United States, the Armed Forces, the role of
the defense lawyer as zealous advocate, and their client.
Thus, exit and voice can either reinforce the legitimacy of the tribunal
or oppose it, and may alternate, interact, or overlap. Part II.C will explore
the impact of these relationships on lawyer choices. First, however, it is nec-
essary to consider the different forums for the exercise of voice.
2. The Expressions of Resistance: Internal and External
As a form of resistance, voice can find expression internally or exter-
nally. Voice can be exercised internally within the confines of the particular
unjust tribunal or within the larger legal system. Internal resistance is shaped
by the faith articulated by Lon Fuller that, "when men are compelled to
explain and justify their decisions, the effect will generally be to pull those
decisions toward goodness, by whatever standards of ultimate goodness there
are." 128 When advocates appear at unfair hearings and use the legal tools
available, including reasoned arguments based on procedural or substantive
legal rules, motions, briefs, presentation of evidence, and appeals, they engage
in internal resistance.
125. Id. at 79.
126. Id. at 82-83.
127. Id. at 84 (noting that "the greater the opportunities for exit, the easier it appears to be for
organizations to resist, evade, and postpone the introduction of internal democracy even though they
function in a democratic environment").
128. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law---A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 636 (1958).
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Lawyers might engage in internal resistance for several reasons. First,
they may believe legal argument will lead to greater procedural justice, on a
large or small scale, in the short or long term. Second, they may believe that
they are building a record of injustice to use in an appeal to a higher author-
ity. Each of these strategies is discussed at greater length in the next subpart,
which schematizes acts of resistance. What is important to note here is that
these are both forms of internal resistance.
When lawyers appeal to another court or court system, they express resis-
tance through voice outside the particular unjust tribunal. But they are still
acting within the broader liberal legal system. When lawyers for Guantdnamo
detainees filed habeas corpus petitions in federal court, they were seeking
review outside of the military commission system, but inside the U.S. justice
system.'29 Similarly, when the lawyers for the SCLC appealed Dr. King's con-
viction to the federal courts, their resistance was external to the Alabama
state court system, but internal to the broader U.S. legal system.130 Appeals to
another court or court system may be filed in part to engage the public at large,
and thus also act as an external expression of voice.
External resistance communicates with the world outside of the unjust
tribunal. The external resistance, either through exit or voice, is shaped by an
assumption that legal change is best achieved in the realm of politics, in which
moral arguments ought to hold more sway."' Lawyers may engage in external
resistance whether they participate in the tribunal or refuse to participate. They
may draw on legal language or on broad political or moral principles. When
exercising voice externally, lawyers call upon outsiders to recognize injustice.
For example, when Mori traveled to Australia to bring attention to his client's
plight, he was engaging in external resistance."2 He hoped that his actions would
spur the Australian government to pressure the United States to liberate Hicks,
overriding the legal structure established by the U.S. Department of Defense.
External expressions of voice can stand alone, or they can supplement the
political protest of the client. For example, Mori's representation of Hicks
allowed the lawyer to serve as the client's surrogate to the public. As we have
seen, however, external resistance can also distract from the client's politi-
cal goals. When the lawyers representing the SCLC in Walker v. City of
129. See Part I.B.1.
130. See Part I.A.1.
131. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 73 (1983). Hart writes:
"[I1f laws reached a certain degree of iniquity then there would be a plain moral obligation to resist
them and to withhold obedience." That is, "laws may be law but too evil to be obeyed." Id. at 77.
132. See supra Part I.B.1.
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Birmingham"' decided not to bring public attention to the injustice of the
Alabama court, they did so because their clients wanted to retain focus on
the protests against segregation in Birmingham, not on the injustices per-
petuated by Southern state courts."'
Lawyers may choose internal and external resistance in the same case.
Hicks's defense lawyers called press conferences, participated in rallies, and
gave speeches,' but they also engaged in every legal strategy available within
the military commission system. Their external resistance brought about a
political intervention that resulted in a plea deal.'36
Although internal and external expressions of resistance may overlap
and manifest within the same case, the distinction between them is useful
because it draws attention to sources of legal change. Internal resistance
aims to alter the tribunal from inside the court system. Lawyers may seek a
statement from another court that the first tribunal was wrong, or a statement
from the tribunal itself that the rules are unjust. By contrast, external resis-
tance places its faith in the political process. It seeks to change the tribunal
through political action.
Finally, legal and practical considerations impose limits on lawyers' ability
to engage in internal and external resistance. Lawyers may be held in contempt
of court and even face jail time for voicing resistance in the courtroom.'37 Courts
may curtail lawyers' public speech about a case under certain circumstances,
even absent national security concerns. 3 Clients' goals and needs also affect
lawyers' ability to engage in legal and political action. Often lawyers will
argue that the duty to zealously represent the client and the duty to uphold
the rule of law are in harmony. As one military lawyer defending a Guantdnamo
detainee explained: "If we're not advocating against the process, we're not
133. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
134. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
135. See LEIGH SALES, DETAINEE 002: THE CASE OF DAVID HICKS 220-21 (2007) (describing
the nature and success of the lawyers' public relations efforts).
136. See Morris Davis, Op-Ed, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A15
(accusing military commissions of being politicized); Josh White, From Chief Prosecutor to Critic at
Guantanamo, WASH. Posr, Apr. 29, 2008, at Al (reporting that "[wihen Hicks struck a secret plea
deal that brought his release, [Chief Prosecutor Morris] Davis said he was not a party to it").
137. See In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding two contempt convictions of
William Kunstler for disrupting trial and violating judge's orders during trial); Gerald F. Uelmen,
Who Is the Lawyer of the Century?, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 613, 636-37 (2000) (describing the proce-
dural history of Kunstler's contempt convictions in the Chicago Seven trial).
138. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (holding that local ethics rles may
regulate extrajudicial lawyer speech regarding pending cases when the attorney knows or reasonably should
know that statements will have "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" the proceeding).
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competently representing our clients." '39 Yet, as in Walker, situations arise
in which a particular expression of resistance will harm the client. Even so,
the lawyer may believe that their duty to the rule of law requires a particular
resistance tactic. The next subpart analyzes the variety of tactics and strategies
of resistance available to lawyers.
C. Acts of Resistance
Having laid the foundation by discussing lawyers' choices between two
forms of resistance, exit and voice, and between expressing voice internally
or externally, this subpart presents an original schema of actions available
to lawyers who face unjust proceedings. In the face of unjust tribunals,
lawyers may (1) boycott the proceedings collectively, (2) decide individually
not to participate, (3) utilize existing law to ameliorate the procedural regime,
(4) appeal to a higher, external authority to correct injustice, or (5) appeal to
present or future members of the public. Each of these strategies may involve
exit or voice and may employ internal or external resistance. Lawyers can
also use these strategies of resistance simultaneously or sequentially. By setting
out these strategies, I hope to spur a much-needed conversation about appro-
priate lawyer reactions to unjust proceedings.
1. Organized Boycott
Imagine that every bar association in the United States prohibited law-
yers from participating in the GuantTamo military commissions because the
commissions failed to provide sufficient procedural protections and because
they violated fundamental principles of the rule of law." If no members of
the bar were available to argue before the commissions or to serve as judges, the
commissions could not function as an adversarial system. The government
might choose to move forward with an inquisitorial process, but at a tre-
mendous cost. In the United States, fair process is commonly understood
to require an adversarial trial.41 The U.S. government's insistence on an
adversarial process in the military commissions, in contrast to its permission of
an inquisitorial process for the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs),
139. William Glaberson, An Unlikely Antagonist in the Detainees' Corner, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2008, at Al (quoting Lt. Cmdr. William Kuebler).
140. The 2003 ethics opinion issued by the NACDL was a failed attempt to start such a move-
ment. This Article does not address the question of whether such a boycott would violate antitrust
laws. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (holding
that a boycott by public defenders to increase their pay violated the Sherman Act).
141. See TYLER ET AL., supra note 91, at 79-80.
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demonstrates the public relations stakes involved in forgoing adversarial pres-
entation.
As a practical matter, however, boycotts are unlikely to succeed at com-
bating procedural injustice in the American legal regime. Establishing a total
boycott would be nearly impossible for two reasons. First, the political views
of members of the legal profession are heterogeneous; achieving agreement
among members of the bar, or between bar committees in individual states,
would be difficult or impossible. Second, lawyers' traditional autonomy to
choose their own clients similarly undermines the ability to establish a
complete bar to representation.'42 Yet only a total boycott would shut down
unfair tribunals. If individual lawyers were merely encouraged to withdraw,
there would always be some who would agree to participate. For example,
participation by some defense lawyers undermined the NACDL's attempt to
promote a total boycott of the Guantdnamo proceedings."'
Even if a boycott were feasible and consistent with the traditions of lawyer
self-governance and pluralism within the legal profession, a strong principled
argument exists against adopting this strategy. Boycotts are coercive. They
force the tribunal to shut down, not through judicial or democratic political
processes, but as a result of the concerted action of a minority. That minority
is only able to close the tribunal because lawyers play a necessary role in its
functioning-not because lawyers have a monopoly on righteousness.
The argument that boycotts are coercive resembles objections to civil
disobedience. Some philosophers have argued that civil disobedience can
cross the line and become coercion when it forces the majority to choose
between accepting the position of the disobedient and doing something it
abhors.'44 Thus, "the dissenters cross the line that separates civil disobedi-
ence from those forms of action that attempt to paralyze the majority's will
142. This difficulty was evident in the NACDL's approach to the Guantdnamo proceedings.
Although the organization made clear its position that participation in the Guantnamo proceedings
was unethical, it also explained that the "NACDL will not condemn criminal defense lawyers who
undertake to represent persons accused before military commissions because some may feel an obligation
to do so." NACDL Ethics Advisory Comm., supra note 53, at 1. For lawyers who felt obliged to
represent detainees, the opinion recommended a course of internal resistance through voice:
If defense counsel undertakes representation and can abide by these rules, counsel must seek to
raise... every conceivable good faith argument concerning the jurisdiction of the military
commission, the legality of denial of application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), international treaties, and due process of law, including resort to the civilian courts
of the United States to determine whether the proceedings are constitutional.
Id.
143. See supra Part I.B.1.
144. See Marshall Cohen, Liberalism and Disobedience, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 287 (1972).
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or the government's ability to act."4' The difference is between speech and
reason on the one hand, and force on the other. Whereas legal and rational
arguments may convince the government or a court to repair the procedural
injustice or to voluntarily shut down a tribunal, refusal to participate forces
the government's hand. A successful defense counsel boycott of the military
commissions would have forced the government to decide between forgoing
all appearance of adversariness and accepting all of the defense lawyers' demands
for reform.'46
The coercion argument against lawyer boycotts is of a piece with argu-
ments favoring role morality for lawyers. Advocates of role morality believe
that lawyers have a professional morality different from the morality required
of ordinary citizens.'47 These advocates object to lawyers exercising their own
moral judgment with respect to clients' goals, so long as those goals are within
the bounds of legality. This position is sometimes supported by the argument
that zealous advocacy promotes democracy by maintaining the integrity of the
adjudicative process. ' In the adversarial model of adjudication, each party
presents its case to a neutral arbiter, who listens to both sides and reaches a
just outcome. Lawyers in an adversarial setting must represent their clients
zealously in order for the system to function properly.
Proponents argue that role morality is necessary in all types of represen-
tation. By declining to pursue their clients' rights on the basis of their own
moral convictions, lawyers substitute their judgment for that of the legisla-
ture, judge, and jury; they create an "oligarchy of lawyers."'44 By choosing to
boycott, lawyers exercise independent judgment and concerted action to halt
entire classes of proceedings. Instead, the decision of a democratically elected
government to create a tribunal deserves to be respected by lawyers who
value democratic decisionmaking processes, even if they believe the tribunal
is unjust."5 In such a situation, the only appropriate avenues for lawyer activ-
ism are political action or internal resistance through argument to the tribunal.
145. Id.
146. Complicating this issue is the fact that some detainees have refused counsel; this issue,
however, is not addressed here. See William Glaberson, Arraigned, 9/11 Suspects Talk of Martyrdom, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2008, at Al (describing Khalid Sheik Mohammad's refusal to be represented by his
attorneys at arraignment).
147. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lauryer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617-18.
148. See, e.g., Joint Conference on Prof l Responsibility, Professional Responsibility: Report of the
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958).
149. Pepper, supra note 147, at 617.
150. The military commissions as constituted in 2001 might be distinguished here because they
were originally created solely by executive order. See Military Order of November 13, 2001:
Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War on Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
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Indeed, the strategy adopted by Salim Hamdan's lawyers in his appeal to
the federal courts was based precisely on faith in democratic decisionmaking
and in separation of powers principles.' Hamdan's lawyers argued that
the commissions were an unconstitutional exercise of executive power.'
The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning and Congress immediately set
about authorizing the military commissions.' Hamdan's lawyers then shifted
their argument to one of fundamental rights. When confronted by a mani-
festly unfair tribunal (even one created by a democratic process), lawyers may
need to substitute their own judgments about what is unjust for those of the
tribunal, at least in some situations. 54
In addition to boycotts' coercive aspects in the political realm, they may
have devastating effects on litigants. One prominent military lawyer advo-
cated against a defense boycott of the military commissions by analogizing
such an action to "doctors refusing to perform lifesaving surgery because of
sub-standard hospital conditions."'55 This analogy overstates the potential
impact on accused who are to be tried before severely unfair tribunals. The
absence of counsel does not matter if the patient cannot be saved. On the other
hand, if there is a possibility, however remote, that advocacy will affect the
tribunal's decisions and lead to fairer results, then lawyers as a group arguably
have a duty to participate in order to aid their clients and prevent injustice.
Boycott is thus a strategy only for lawyers (and clients) who hold no hope of
changing the system from within and who are willing to pay a bitter price.
In contrast, hope gave civil rights leaders a reason to pursue a legal strat-
egy even in utterly inhospitable venues, such as the Alabama state courts
presided over by segregationist judges. Although many members of the move-
ment disagreed, King and others held out hope that civil rights demonstrators
57,833 (2001). Only the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 gave them legislative
imprimatur. See Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10 & 42 U.S.C.).
151. For discussions of this decision, see MAHLER, supra note 72, at 227, and Neil Kumar
Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 84-97
(2005). See also supra Part I.B.2.
152. Katyal, supra note 151, at 84-97.
153. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634-35 (2006); Military Commissions Act of
2006, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948-950 (West 2008).
154. 1 do not assume here that all democratic processes are in fact legitimate, either as a legal,
sociological, or moral matter. See generady Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1787 (2005) (describing three types of legitimacy); Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legiti-
macion in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 379, 407-18 (critiquing the concept of sociological
legitimacy and arguing that legitimacy is an inaccurate description of why people obey the law).
155. Vanessa Blum, Tribunals Put Defense Bar in a Bind, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), July 14,
2003, at 1 (describing the statements of Walter Cox IIl, former chief judge of the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces).
might get a fair shake in Southern courts.'56 Similarly, lawyers pursuing jus-
tice in apartheid South Africa returned to the court system again and again
with their clients' grievances." 7 For these advocates, legal victories, however
small, "demonstrate[d the regime's] vulnerability and erode[d] its will to
dominate.""'5 Participation can be a powerful strategy for reform; and often
a second-best solution is better than none. This was true in the Hicks case. A
plea deal could not have been reached without attorney involvement, and,
in the absence of a plea, Hicks would likely still be held in Guantdnamo"9
On the other hand, a boycott may be warranted because it is better for
the client that lawyers stop the injustice entirely, rather than continue to
provide the cover of adversarialism to an unjust process. If the argument in
favor of boycott rests on the client's welfare, then the client's consent would
be required. But like lawyers, clients have heterogeneous points of view. Not
all clients will agree with this strategy, even if their lawyer believes it is in the
clients' long-term self-interest. Moreover, the process of convincing clients
can change from persuasion to coercion, because the lawyer wields power by
threatening to withdraw.
At bottom, undertaking a boycott is both morally problematic and risky.
The government may respond by conducting inquisitorial tribunals without
defense counsel present. Or it may postpone acting until the boycott ends,
detaining the client for an indefinite period to force the lawyer to acquiesce
to participation. To the extent the boycott is unsuccessful, the participating
lawyers have abandoned the accused to trial alone and failed to achieve sys-
temic changes.
2. Individual Refusal
In keeping with our individualistic tradition, the legal profession's response
to procedural injustice is to permit each lawyer to decide individually whether
or not to participate in an unfair hearing. As one public defender said of the
military commissions, "You wonder whether you're doing more harm than
good when you insert yourself into a system you don't agree with and find
morally repugnant. We all have our breaking point where a system is so
fundamentally flawed, we can't justify participating in it."'" The tactic of
156. See supra text accompanying note 19.
157. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 549.
158. Id.
159. See supra Part I.B.1.
160. Blum, supra note 155, at 1 (quoting Barry Boss, former assistant public defender and partner
at Asbill, Moffitt & Boss).
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individual refusal recognizes that people's breaking points differ as to when
a tribunal is so unfair that withdrawal becomes necessary. This recognition
affirms plural conceptions of justice. A commitment to plural conceptions
of justice by implication requires that decisions regarding participation be
made individually.
Individual refusal can consist of refusal to participate in the first instance,
quiet withdrawal, or public withdrawal. Analogies between lawyer resis-
tance and other forms of political resistance illuminate the choices lawyers
face. The decision to publicly withdraw is analogous to civil disobedience, a
form of public resistance that relies on political justifications. The decisions
not to participate at all or to privately withdraw can be analogized to conscien-
tious objection, a form of private resistance that originates in personal, moral
convictions. 16 The categories of public versus private and political versus
moral justifications are not fixed, but these concepts nevertheless aid in
understanding the complexity of individual resistance. This is only a rough
analogy because actors who engage in civil disobedience and conscientious
objection in fact break the law, whereas lawyers who individually resist unjust
tribunals do not, despite their acts manifesting a form of transgression.
Civil disobedience is a "public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political
act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in
the law or policies of the government. 1 62 It is a fundamentally public act,
comparable "to public speech, and being a form of address, an expression of
profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes place in a public
forum.', 163 In other words, civil disobedience is an exercise of communication
through law breaking. The lawyer's decision to withdraw publicly from repre-
sentation is similar. Consider Joshua Dratel's refusal to sign the notice of
appearance requiring him to agree to comply with all rules of the Guantdnamo
military commission, including those not yet written, in his representation of
David Hicks." Dratel publicly refused to comply with the requirements of the
tribunal, just as a civil disobedient refuses to comply with the offending law.
Dratel's refusal resulted in his public disqualification, which served as a tool
to communicate the depth of his opposition to the tribunal's injustice. His
act is an example of exit with maximum voice.
161. Several philosophers have discussed the distinction between conscientious objection and
civil disobedience. I rely (in broad strokes) on the distinction as drawn by John Rawls. See RAWLS,
supra note 85, at 363-91 (discussing civil disobedience and conscientious objection, and their roles
in a just society); see also HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC: LYING IN POLITICS; CIVIL
DISOBEDIENCE; ON VIOLENCE; THOUGHTS ON POLITICS AND REVOLUTION 49-102 (1972).
162. RAWLS, supra note 85, at 364.
163. Id. at 366.
164. See supra Part I.B. 1.
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Conscientious objection, on the other hand, is a private act of "noncom-
pliance with a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative order.' 65
Familiar examples include the refusal to pay a tax or to serve in the armed
forces. The two principal differences between conscientious objection and
civil disobedience are that conscientious objection is not a form of address to
the larger public and it need not be based on political principles, but can be
based on personal morality, religious conviction, or any other source. 66 Civil
disobedience, on the other hand, is always addressed to the public and is
"guided and justified by political principles, that is, by the principles of justice
which regulate the constitution and social institutions generally.
'1 61
The individual refusal to represent a client before an unjust tribunal ini-
tially or to withdraw from representation without taking a public stand may
be analogized to conscientious objection. Had the SCLC's lawyers refused to
participate in King's contempt trial, that would have been a form of conscien-
tious objection. It seems likely that such a decision would have been made
privately, without public spectacle.
Both civil disobedience and conscientious objection are acts intended at
some level to resist injustice and strengthen the rule of law. At the same time,
they pose a threat to democracy and to the rule of law; in both, individuals
refuse to obey a law enacted by the legislature."6 Nevertheless, "there are
limits to the injustice that is compatible with political obligation."69 Some
injustices are incompatible with the rule of law and with democratic princi-
ples, and they demand extralegal action. 7' Similarly, there are limits to the
procedural injustice that a lawyer can tolerate as consistent with professional
responsibility not only to the client, but to the rule of law.
In addition to political effects, we should not forget the personal costs
to clients of individual refusal. Both quiet refusal to participate and public
withdrawal have the practical effect of abandoning clients, who must work with
new counsel or fend for themselves. Where withdrawal of individuals critical
to the representation can halt the proceeding, this course of action may be
justified on grounds that it will benefit the clients. But if the clients are left
to defend themselves, the lawyers' moral purity comes at the clients' expense.
What at first appears to be an other-regarding act of selflessness in the name
165. RAWLS, supra note 85, at 364.
166. Id. at 369.
167. Id. at 365.
168. 1 leave open the question of whether such processes are truly democratic or legitimate.
169. David Lyons, Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience, 27 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 31,35 (1998).
170. An example is when one group bears the brunt of injustice systematically. See RAWLS,
supra note 85, at 355.
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of liberal legal principles is also a self-regarding act of moral purity that, in the
end, is sullied by the harm done to the client.
If the clients can be represented by other lawyers, the coercive power of
the lawyers' decision to refuse to participate or withdraw is limited. Lawyers
who refuse to participate in the first instance will be replaced by others,
with likely little effect on the tribunal. But such withdrawal, followed by
replacement with substitute counsel, may be detrimental to the clients. In
David Hicks's case, the Guantinamo military commission intended to go
forward with the trial even after the withdrawal of Hicks's most experienced
counsel.' The secret plea agreement appears to have been reached prior to
Joshua Dratel's withdrawal, and therefore the harm to the client was mini-
mal.'72 Hicks continued to be represented by able, but less experienced,
assigned military counsel.'73 Nevertheless, the harm to the client of losing lead
counsel so late in the proceedings could have been severe.'74 The story of
Salim Hamdan's CSRT hearing illustrates the symbolic importance of the
lawyer's continuing presence.'75 Although Hamdan's lawyer, Charles Swift,
tried to explain that his presence would have changed nothing, Hamdan still
felt abandoned.'76
Withdrawal and refusal to represent the accused share the same basic
difficulties. Lawyers who withdraw abandon their clients, to whom they owe
a fiduciary duty, and give up the potential to prevent injustice through inter-
nal resistance. Lawyers may experience this crisis most acutely in the act of
withdrawal, having already developed a relationship with and duty of loyalty
to the particular clients. But the failure to fulfill the duty of representation
and the loss of opportunity to effect change are equally present when lawyers
choose not to participate in the proceeding at all. 7 They may rely on other
lawyers to take their places, thereby alleviating some of the burden, but they
know that these lawyers will likely face the same crises. These lawyers essen-
tially pass the problems to others, rather than facing them. And the next
lawyer asked to represent a defendant before the unfair tribunal faces the
same choice. For this reason, individual autonomy in the decisions to withdraw
171. See supra Part I.B. 1.
172. See supra Part I.B. 1.
173. See supra Part I.B.1.
174. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002) (governing withdrawal of coun-
sel and requiring that upon withdrawal "a lawyer shall take steps... to protect a client's interests").
175. See supra Part 1.B.2.
176. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
177. On the flip side, lawyers may attempt to participate even in the absence of a client, as
Katyal urged the military defense lawyers before they were assigned to represent Hamdan. See supra
Part I.B.2.
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or not to participate at all come at the clients' expense and at the expense of
the possibility of large-scale resistance to injustice. Both may result in the loss
of opportunities to effect substantial change.
3. "Using the Master's Tools to Dismantle the Master's House"'178
A third avenue available to lawyers facing procedural injustice is to par-
ticipate in the tribunal and to use legal argument to import principles of
procedural justice from the larger liberal legal regime into the unjust tribunal.
This approach can be summed up in the phrase "using the master's tools to
dismantle his house."'79 The idea is to appeal to fundamental principles of justice
already existent in the law to alter unjust conditions. As one military offi-
cer said about the Guantfnamo military commissions: "[Hiaving civilian
attorneys involved is good for the system. If they think the system is wrong, go
prove it's wrong.""
If successful, this approach can result in either incremental or large-scale
changes. For example, the Alabama state court judge presiding over King's
1963 trial could have ruled that the underlying injunction was invalid, repre-
senting incremental progress.18" ' Conversely, a military commission judge could
find that due process protections apply to noncitizen detainees, which would
engender large-scale change. If this were to occur, lawyer advocacy will have
had the direct and immediate effect of eradicating injustice. For this approach
to work, the lawyer must believe that there are fundamental legal principles,
found in universally recognized texts, which through legal interpretation and
reason lead to the just result. Furthermore, the lawyer must believe that the
judge is sufficiently neutral or at least sufficiently steeped in the liberal legal
tradition to be able to hear these arguments. Whether the lawyer's evaluation
is correct as an empirical matter will become clear only after the judge has
made a determination. Evaluating the success of this strategy is only possible
in hindsight.
The most well-known example of appeal to legal principles to bring
sweeping change to an unjust legal system was the appeal to the Equal
Protection Clause to undo the regime of legalized segregation in the American
178. See LORDE, supra note 11, at 110-13.
179. See id.
180. Blum, supra note 155 (quoting Walter Cox III, former Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces).
181. See supra Part I.A.1.
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South.182 Yet upon reflection, this example is not one of rapid, large-scale
change. The initial judicial pronouncements eliminating de jure segregation
were powerful, but it took many years, substantial political agitation, and
legislative action to eliminate the legal regime of segregation.' s' Moreover,
the agents of change in the courts were not Southern state court judges, but
instead federal judges who were both outside (not part of the Southern state
judiciary) and inside (citizens of Southern states in which their courts were
located) the unjust system.
Large scale change is gratifying when it happens; it represents a clear
victory. Incremental change is more complicated. It is a tactic for optimists. In
his book on lawyers in apartheid South Africa, Richard Abel concludes: "The
legal battles described in this book did not win the war by themselves. But
they empowered the masses while offering some protection from state retalia-
tion.'"" Or as legal sociologists Susan Silbey and Patricia Ewick explain,
'individuals identify the cracks and vulnerabilities of organized power' in the
acts of resistance."'' s The jurisprudential theory embedded in strategies seeking
incremental change is pragmatic, taking advantage of the possibilities for justice
wherever they can be found."8 Small victories in the courtroom may open
the door for more substantial changes.' For example, once Joshua Dratel
obtained a concession from the Guantfnamo military commission with
regard to client monitoring, every civilian lawyer could demand this conces-
sion as well.'" Such incremental changes may alter the law through internal
logic or through external pressure. Incrementalism is also the strategy advo-
cated by the Supreme Court in Walker v. City of Birmingham.8 9
182. See generally MARK V. TusHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
183. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2006)).
184. ABEL, supra note 8, at 549.
185. EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 86, at 187.
186. For a history of pragmatism in American legal thought, see Thomas C. Grey, Hear the
Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
187. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 549; EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 86, at 187.
188. See supra Part I.B.1.
189. The Supreme Court advocated this strategy of pursuing incremental change through legal
argument to the civil rights movement in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The
Court stated that the litigants had an obligation to challenge the injunction before the Alabama courts,
and only if they met with "delay or frustration" could they choose to disobey the injunction. Id. at 318.
This statement is an affirmation of the particular strategy of internal resistance through the court
system. As commentators have pointed out, however, the opinion delegitimizes the petitioners' claim
to civil disobedience that is respectful of the rule of law; this was expressed in their argument that the
underlying injunction was clearly unconstitutional. This point is made in an excellent article by David
Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L REV. 2152, 2174-75 (1989).
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Audrey Lorde had quite the opposite in mind when she wrote that
"the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house."'' Genuine change,
she argued, must come from outside the system, because the system will only
give insiders momentary victories limited by the master's tools themselves."'
For this reason some believe that unjust legal regimes can only be resisted
extralegally-that only external resistance achieves progress. As we saw earlier,
the civil rights movement focused its efforts on protest outside the courts,
rather than on achieving justice within the Southern court system through
legal argument.' The court system was secondary to its larger political strategy.
Some argue that internal resistance is merely "individualistic, self-
interested, and inconsequential, as opposed to collective, principled and
effective."'93 Even worse, individual actions may sufficiently ameliorate condi-
tions for a brief time to make insufferable situations tolerable, and in doing so
"actually inoculate power from sustained and collective challenge."'94 When
Dratel negotiated in 2003 to obtain access to his client without monitoring, as
a condition of participating in the military commission process, he achieved a
significant victory.'95 But that victory was fleeting. In 2006, the presiding offi-
cer reasserted the arbitrary power of the tribunal by requiring that Dratel sign
the notice of appearance.' Although the compromise initially allowed Dratel
to agree to represent Hicks, it did little to alter the basic unfairness of the
tribunal, including the absence of rules set in advance, the potential for the
introduction of coerced evidence, and the fact that Hicks would still likely not
be released absent a guilty plea. Perhaps the lawyers would have been in a
stronger position to resist injustice had they boycotted the tribunal initially.
4. Making a Record for a Higher Tribunal
Lawyers sometimes participate in unjust proceedings in order to create a
record for another court, one with greater potential to be neutral, fair, and
just, and with the power to undo the wrongs of the unjust tribunal. The law-
yers defending King in his 1963 criminal contempt trial and the lawyers
seeking habeas relief for Guantdnamo detainees both adopted this strategy."'
These lawyers participated in the unjust proceedings in the tribunals in order
190. LORDE, supra note 178, at 112 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. See supra Part I.A.1.
193. EWiCK & SILBEY, supra note 86, at 186 (critiquing the position presented herein).
194. Id. at 187.
195. See supra Part I.B.1.
196. See supra Part I.B.1.
197. See supra Parts I.A.1 and I.B.1.
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to develop a record of injustice. They then turned to the federal courts,
believing that these would stay true to fundamental legal protections: due
process, equal protection, and separation of powers.
Lawyers for the civil rights movement defended King against contempt
charges in the Alabama state court under the assumption that he would not
get a fair trial there, but with the intent of making a record that would
permit the reviewing federal court to find in his favor. As part of their
strategy, they introduced evidence of the dismissive treatment of members
of the SCLC who tried to obtain a permit to march.'98 That evidence was
not relevant to the contempt proceeding, and was unlikely to sway the state
court judge. Nevertheless it deeply affected the justices who dissented from
the Supreme Court's decision in Walker. Only the dissenters were willing
to acknowledge that the defendants could not have gotten a fair hearing in
the Alabama state court. By contrast, in the Montgomery Bus Boycott trial,
King's lawyers were not making a record for a higher tribunal (they never
appealed). They also introduced evidence that was not strictly relevant to
the trial in order to communicate to the White community the suffering of
Blacks under segregation. '99
Establishing facts at the trial level to demonstrate injustice may have a
powerful impact on reviewing judges. But it still requires participation in the
unfair tribunal. Again and again, as Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2° moved up the fed-
eral court hierarchy, the lawyers used the fact of Hamdan's exclusion from the
voir dire proceedings in 2004 to prove that the commissions were unfair."'
The reviewing judges seem to have found the fact of his exclusion more
offensive to fundamental ideas of due process than the discretionary rule
permitting exclusion. '
The practical problems with the strategy of appeal to a higher tribunal
are twofold. First, the higher court may not agree that the tribunal below is
indeed unjust, as when the Supreme Court upheld King's contempt convic-
tion in Walker."3 Furthermore, even if the higher tribunal does ameliorate
the injustice, it may do so in a way that does not ultimately reform the unjust
system. Even Hamdan's success before the Supreme Court did not spell the
end of the military commissions. 4 After the Court struck down the military
198. See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 94.
199. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307,340 (1967); Part I.A.2.
200. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
201. See MAHLER, supra note 72, at 133-37, 159.
202. See id. (describing judicial reactions in oral argument).
203. 388 U.S. 307.
204. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557. See generally Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the
"War on Terror," 108 COLUM. L REv. 1013, 1061-79 (2008) (accounting for the procedural focus of
commissions, Congress immediately set about authorizing them.2- Although
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 may have eliminated the grossest
206injustices, substantial criticisms remain.
5. Appealing to Public Opinion
The final strategy lawyers may adopt is to participate in the tribunal in
order to spur political action outside the courts. Lawyers might appeal to
public opinion in three ways. First, they might conduct the trial in a way that
highlights injustice, and use their position to present information about
that injustice to the public. Lawyers adopting this method put the tribunal
on trial in the court of public opinion. A related but somewhat different tactic
involves creating a "theater of the absurd" in the tribunal. Finally, lawyers may
participate in order to make a historical record and to bear witness for posterity.
When lawyers put the court on trial in the court of public opinion, they
conduct the trial in a way that highlights injustice. Sometimes lawyers use
their participation to gather evidence of this injustice to bring to the public.
Participation in the proceedings gives lawyers direct proof of unfairness that
they would otherwise lack. The lawyers publicize this information through the
press or perform within the tribunal in a way calculated to draw the atten-
tion of the press (and thereby the public) to the injustice. This is a useful
approach when the injustice facing the client is the tribunal. For example, in
the military commissions context, the client detainees' larger purpose was
advanced by drawing public attention to injustice in the tribunal procedures
because the tribunal's injustice was the problem these clients faced.
Not only does participation provide lawyers with evidence of injustice,
but it permits access to the client. This access allows the lawyer to speak
credibly for the victim of injustice, amplifying the lawyer's voice. Dan Mori
adopted this strategy in his representation of David Hicks."7 The Department
of Defense denied Hicks contact with the outside world, so Mori spoke for him.
Mori's avowed purpose was to sway public opinion in Australia and to put
the Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding the "War on Terror" and the Court's refusal to resolve
substantive questions).
205. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948-950 (West 2008) (giving the
Executive power to convene military commissions).
206. Critics were concerned that the Military Commissions Act did not require the application
of the Fifth Amendment to military commissions proceedings, did not bar the introduction of evi-
dence obtained through torture and mistreatment, and did not provide for access to evidence against
the accused. See sources cited in note 8, supra. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not
addressed these questions. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (permitting habeas peti-
tions to proceed in the lower federal courts).
207. See supra Part I.B.1.
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pressure on the Australian government to act on behalf of his client.2" Rep-
resenting Hicks gave Mori credibility; being a military lawyer gave him even
more credibility. Had Mori been an ordinary citizen concerned about Hicks or
the military commission system, his protests would not have been meaningful.
In other cases, putting the court on trial does not advance the client's
goals." Lawyers for the civil rights movement adopted a purely legal strategy
and ruled out suggestions to put the Southern courts on trial because they
thought that such action would be counterproductive to the movement's reli-
ance on federal injunctions to dismantle desegregation.21 Furthermore, the
SCLC and its lawyers agreed that trying the Southern courts in the court of
public opinion would distract attention from the Birmingham protests. They
did not want the contempt trial to overshadow their clients' larger purpose.
In the Montgomery Bus Boycott trial, lawyers used the courtroom as a forum
to air Black grievances, making a public statement through the trial. But there
the court itself was not on trial; Jim Crow was."'
A second use of the trial for political action transforms the courtroom
into a theater of the absurd. The defendants in the Chicago Seven Trial, and
their lawyer, William Kunstler, adopted this tactic."2 The defendants were
eight social activists accused of conspiring to incite a riot at the 1968 Democratic
National Convention in Chicago."3 During the trial, the defendants and their
lawyers staged many theatrical moments. Bobby Seale, the only Black
defendant and a member of the Black Panthers, vociferously insisted on rep-
resenting himself against the judge's orders. The judge ordered him bound
and gagged before the jury."4 Two other defendants, Abbie Hoffman and
Jerry Rubin, arrived in judges' robes affixed with yellow Jewish stars. Hoffman
then removed his robe to reveal the shirt of a Chicago police officer.2"5
Judge Julius Hoffman at one point admonished: "We are not running a circus.
208. See SALES, supra note 135, at 220-21 (describing the nature and success of Mori's public
relations efforts in Australia). The British government had earlier sought release of its citizens from
Guantnamo, spurring the belief that political intervention was necessary to obtain release. See id. at
100-01.
209. See supra Part 1.A. 1.
210. See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 94.
211. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
212. The fascinating story of the way these defendants, with their lawyer's assistance, turned
the courtroom into a circus is told in detail elsewhere. See Lahav, supra note 119, at 385 n.19 (citing
studies of the Chicago Seven trial).
213. See id. at 385.
214. Id. at 387. Seale's trial was severed from that of the other seven defendants after this inci-
dent. Id. at 384.
215. Id. at 389-90.
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This happens to be a court."' 1 6 William Kunstler called the proceedings a "legal
lynching"'2 7 in open court and stated to the judge, "I am going to turn back to
my seat with the realization that everything I have learned throughout my life
has come to naught, that there is no meaning in this court, there is no law in
this court.'' 2.8 These statements were the basis of a contempt charge against
Kunstler. At the end of the trial, the judge summarily convicted all the defen-
dants and their attorneys of contempt for their actions throughout the
trial.219 The defense's purpose in deploying these tactics seemed to be at
once to attract personal attention, draw attention to the absurdity of the
justice system, and entice the judge to act in ways that further demonstrated his
lawlessness.22 These types of spectacles can spur either insight or revulsion
in the public. In addition to risking alienating the public, such theatrics
arguably violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.22 '
Sometimes trying the tribunal in the court of public opinion or creating
a theater of the absurd may not be possible. The lawyer may not be permitted
to speak about the proceedings for national security reasons, or the public
may not be ready to listen. Nonetheless, the lawyer may continue representa-
tion in order to bear witness, as did one appointed military defense lawyer
appearing before the Guantdnamo commissions. He sat at the defense table
and declined to advocate under instructions from his client, who was boy-
cotting the proceedings.222 The lawyer's presence has two possible purposes
in this situation. First, the lawyer may choose to be present in order to create
a historical record and serve as a witness to the injustice at later proceedings.
Second, the lawyer may believe that his presence as a witness will shame the
tribunal or spur the tribunal to recognize the injustice it is perpetuating. In
sitting by the defendant's side as a witness, the lawyer seeks to create self-
awareness on the part of the tribunal that may lead to greater fidelity to the
rule of law.
Bearing witness is a limited role, but one that may have great value.
Salim Hamdan excoriated his lawyer, Charles Swift, for failing to attend his
CSRT hearing, even though Swift's presence would have had little effect on
216. Id. at 381.
217. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1338 (N.D. 111. 1973).
218. Id.
219. Lahav, supra note 119, at 390.
220. Id. at 447 ("From the perspective of the defense, the trial was about showing how... leviathan
harbors and often deploys lawlessness, thereby threatening ordered liberty.").
221. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.5, cmt. 4 (2002) ("An advocate can present the
cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness
no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.").
222. See Glaberson, supra note 44.
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the outcome."3 Swift had quite literally prepared to be a witness solely in
order to be by his client's side. If nothing more, perhaps Swift's presence
could have partially alleviated Hamdan's feeling of abandonment before a
hostile tribunal. At the same time, the lawyer who bears witness leaves behind
the role of advocate and becomes something else entirely-an observer, sup-
porter, conscience, or, perhaps, a friend. The role may seem like pretense and it
risks creating the false appearance that the client has meaningful representation.
As Joshua Dratel explained to the military commission when offered the oppor-
tunity to remain by Hicks's side without the ability to advocate on his behalf:
"I'm not going to pretend that I'm here functioning when I'm not entitled
to do my job."22'
III. THE LAWYER'S ROLE AND PROCEDURAL INJUSTICE
The analysis in Part II examined the choices available to lawyers faced
with unjust proceedings and demonstrated the difficulty of the dilemmas they
face. Two fundamental questions remain. First, can the lawyer's crisis be
resolved by reference to a shared understanding of the lawyer's role in the
adversarial process and in society? That is, do the lawyer's professional duties
dictate a particular response to unjust proceedings? Second, at what point, if
any, is procedural injustice so egregious that it demands resistance-and how
can lawyers identify it?
With respect to the first question, our shared understanding of the law-
yer's role grounded in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct-as fiduciary
of the client and defender of the rule of law-does not help in resolving the
lawyer's crisis. Instead, it creates conflicting obligations, particularly in the con-
text of the unjust tribunal, that cannot be reconciled. The traditional
argument is that this conflict is illusory. In service of their clients, lawyers
will inevitably participate in doing justice. Whether or not this position is
true in the ordinary case (and I do not think it is), we have seen that the
ideal of client service does not resolve the problem of complicity in the unjust
tribunal. In that context, service to the client through participation can ren-
der lawyers complicit in the tribunal's injustice and potentially leave their
clients no better off. Refusal to participate or boycott may cleanse the lawyer
of direct complicity, but abandons the client. Furthermore, I argue below
that because law is dynamic, lawyers also have a role as architects of social
structures and "builders-up" of law. This role puts further pressure on lawyers
223. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
224. Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 27; see supra Part I.B.1.
Portraits of Resistance 771
not to contribute to injustice. The problem is that lawyers may contribute to
injustice either by standing by or participating, by risking complicity or aban-
doning their clients. Therefore, our conceptions of the lawyer's role do not tell
the lawyer which course of action to take in the face of procedural injustice.
Secondly, to distinguish between the ordinary case and the extraordi-
nary case of procedural injustice that triggers the problems discussed here, we
need a definition of procedural justice."5 The mandate that lawyers promote
justice begs the question of what justice is. A complete theory of procedural
justice is beyond the scope of this Article, for among other reasons, the theory
of procedural justice is contested. I attempt to demonstrate in Part 1II.B
some of the ways in which procedural justice is contested as an empirical mat-
ter. Even so, this uncertainty does not absolve lawyers of responsibility for
struggling with injustice because law is dynamic and lawyers play a crucial
role in law's development. I discuss the implications of the fact that lawyers'
actions play a role in increasing or decreasing injustice in Part III.C. Despite
uncertainty, lawyers are forced to evaluate whether a tribunal is unjust, and
their actions in response to that injustice will be judged by posterity. Lawyers
themselves are aware of this. '26
A. The Lawyer's Professional Duties Do Not Dictate the Response
to Injustice
Recourse to our traditional, and ultimately rather thin, conception of
the lawyer's role provides little help to the lawyer facing the unjust tribunal.
Instead, it merely restates the tension between service to the client and fidel-
ity to the rule of law.
There are two cliched views of the lawyer: as a client-centered agent or
as an officer of the court. In the traditional, client-centered view,227 the rules
225. This Article also leaves open the question of how to determine whether injustice is iso-
lated or systemic. See supra note 7 (discussing the issue of systemic injustice in the context of death
penalty appeals).
226. As one prosecutor in the military commissions wrote to his superior upon resigning: "It will
be expected that I should have been aware of the shortcomings with this endeavor, and that I reacted
accordingly." Email From Capt. John Carr to Col. Fred Borch (Mar. 15, 2004) (on file with author).
227. This ideal of lawyer responsibility to the client is sometimes referred to as "neutral parti-
sanship," by which scholars mean that lawyers are to be neutral to their clients' ends and partisan in
helping them to achieve their goals. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-37 (describing and critiquing the concept of
neutral partisanship); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
63 (1980) (same). This ideal is popularly thought of as "zealous advocacy," words that appear in the
preamble to the Model Rules as well as in some of the commentary. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules
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of professional ethics and the legal standards developed to govern lawyers
generally reflect an understanding of the lawyer as a fiduciary to the client.
For example, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to
abide by their clients' decisions regarding the goals of representation as well
as by the clients' choices made during the course of representation. 1 8 The
Rules limit the lawyers' ability to represent clients with conflicting interests
and emphasize the necessity of client consent to any conflict.229 They require
lawyers to maintain loyalty to the client even after the relationship has ter-
minated.23 Lawyers must not only be loyal to their clients, but they must be
perceived to be loyal. When considering motions to disqualify counsel, for
example, judges will look not only to actual conflicts, but also to the appear-
ance of impropriety.2"1 The Rules further limit lawyers' ability to withdraw
from representation if withdrawal will harm the client.232
A robust version of the principle of fidelity to the client's goals is justi-
fied by the argument that access to lawyers in our society often is the only
means of access to justice.233 If lawyers withhold representation on the basis
of their own judgments, particularly (although not exclusively) in the crimi-
nal context, the lawyer serves as "judge and jury" rather than leaving this
function to the courts.3 The lawyer's loyalty also affirms the values of
respect for the autonomy and dignity of the individual-the ability to make
one's own decisions and to set one's own goals.235 Finally, in the absence of
of the adversary system."); MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. (2002) ("A lawyer must
also act... with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
228. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (governing conflicts of interest with present
clients), R. 1.9 (governing conflicts of interest with former clients) (2002).
230. MODEL RULES OF PROF' CONDUCT R. 1.9.
231. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Res., Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J.) (disqualifying counsel based on appearance of conflict).
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2002).
233. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30,36-37 (Harold J.
Berman ed., 1961) (arguing that the lawyer must represent even the client he thinks is guilty in order for
the adversarial system to work); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questiors, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1482 (1966) (arguing that loyalty is
required to realize the policies of "the maintenance of an adversary system, the presumption of innocence,
the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, and the obligation
of confidentiality between lawyer and client"); Pepper, supra note 149 (arguing that subordination
of the lawyer's own moral views to the client's goals is required to maintain client autonomy and provide
access to justice).
234. George Sharswood wrote: "The lawyer, who refuses his professional assistance because in
his judgment the case is unjust and indefensible, usurps the functions of both judge and jury." Quoted
in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 20 (2007).
235. This is the moral basis of Pepper's theory of "first class citizenship," which argues essentially
that lawyers translate the goals of individuals into the language of the justice system so that individuals
can participate fully in political life." See Pepper, supra note 149. For a similar argument that tries to
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the promise of loyalty, clients might not seek legal representation, and both the
clients and the bar would suffer as a result.
A second principle governing lawyer conduct is the conception that the
lawyer is an officer of the court whose primary duty is to uphold the rule of law.
This principle is much less developed in the ethics rules, but it nevertheless has
been a consistent counterpoint to the principle of zealous advocacy. The
Preamble to the Model Rules states that a lawyer is "an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice." '236 To further this goal, the Rules require candor to the tribunal and
demand that the attorney exercise "independent professional judgment." '237
The Rules explicitly forbid the lawyer from presenting testimony known to be
false, bringing frivolous lawsuits, and engaging in "conduct intended to disrupt
the tribunal." '238 Finally, lawyers may not agree to restrict their practice as part
of a settlement.39
Scholars have relied on these provisions and other sources to argue that
lawyers have various public duties in addition to their private obligations
to the client. Some scholars argue that lawyers have a responsibility to safeguard
the framework of arrangements that make society work, and that this means
taking into account the good of society as well as their client's interests'
40
Others argue that lawyers have an obligation to apply the law to their clients'
situations while upholding the meaning of legal norms broadly defined
because law's legitimacy requires that lawyers act as its custodians.24 Finally,
scholars have debated the relationship between the lawyer's personal morality
and the duty of service to the client,242 as well as the tension between a lawyer's
identification with an affinity group and the duty of loyalty to the client.
root lawyer fidelity to client goals in political theory see DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL
ETHICs: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE (2008).
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002).
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (candor toward the tribunal), R. 2.1 (advisor)
(2002).
238. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (meritorious claims), R. 3.5 (impartiality and
decorum of the tribunal) (2002).
239. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2002).
240. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:
LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION (Deborah Rhode ed., 2000).
241. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005).
242. Compare Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Layer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976) (arguing that the lawyer's morality must be subordinate to
the client's goals), with Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
63 (1980) (arguing in favor of the lawyer's moral agency in the professional role).
243. See David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition and Professional Responsibility,
57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998) (discussing the relationship between professional identity, race and
morality in legal representation).
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The twin values of duty to the client and fidelity to the rule of law may
sometimes complement one another. This occurs, for example, when pointing
out the injustice of a particular governmental action also serves a client's
interests." When these values conflict with one another, however, recourse
to the lawyer's "role" does not dictate the correct course of action. Forexample,
when Dratel was asked to sign a notice of appearance assenting to procedural
rules that had yet to be promulgated, his duty to defend his client and his
fidelity to the principle that laws should be known in advance were in
conflict. Similarly, when King's lawyers contemplated whether to participate
in a contempt hearing that they knew to be a sham, they faced a conflict
between their duty to defend their client against contempt charges and the
risk that their participation would perpetuate the injustice of a biased court
by lending it the appearance of legitimacy.
The principle of fidelity to the rule of law is not as simple as the require-
ment that the lawyer uphold the law as written, because the relationship
between lawyers and law is dynamic. The Model Rules assume that the law
preexists the lawyer's decision to act.245 But the lawyer's relationship with legal
institutions is more than just that of a subject. The lawyer is also an "architect
of social structures," '246 and legal institutions are among these structures.
One of the definitions of architect is "a builder-up." '247 Lawyers build up
legal institutions. They participate in designing and framing legal institutions
in a variety of ways, such as by bringing lawsuits and by framing legal argu-
ments, which are then adopted (or rejected) by judges and become precedent.
The lawyer's role as architect (in collaboration with other legal and nonlegal
actors) extends to all aspects of legal institutions, which are continually being
made and remade by the lawyers who participate in them. For this reason, as
David Luban explains, "the ordinary law practice of ordinary lawyers deserves
attention because it is central to the rule of law."24 A lawyer is not merely a le-
gal technician hired to serve the client, but is also part of a legal community and
a crucial participant in the maintenance and formation of legal institutions
244. I am thinking here of situations such as racial profiling, where demonstrating that the cli-
ent suffered a constitutional deprivation also supports equal protection principles.
245. The best argument that the Model Rules incorporate a positivist view of law is Simon,
supra note 227, at 36.
246. Lon L. Fuller, The Lawyer as an Architect of Social Structures, in THE PRINCIPLES OF
SOCIAL ORDER: THE ARTICLES OF LON FULLER 264-70 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981).
247. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 613 (2008) (Definition 3 of the word "architect"
states: "One who so plans, devises, contrives, or constructs, as to achieve a desired result (especially
when the result may be viewed figuratively as an edifice); a builder-up.").
248. LUBAN, supra note 234, at 6.
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and laws. The individual lawyer's actions may seem small, but they are part
of a very large, important project that structures our lives.249
Consider the decisions made by lawyers for Salim Hamdan in their argu-
ments before the Supreme Court as an example of this architectural role. In
the course of their representation, Hamdan's lawyers sought a ruling from the
Supreme Court that the military commissions were unconstitutional. They
framed their arguments in terms of separation of powers and the correct proc-
ess for convening military commissions rather than in terms of fundamental
rights. The Supreme Court invalidated the military commissions on these
structuralist grounds, but the victory for the client was short lived because, in
response, Congress promptly passed the Military Commissions Act.5 We
cannot know what would have happened had Hamdan's lawyers chosen to
make arguments rooted in fundamental rights."' We know that the argu-
ments they did make resulted in congressional ratification legalizing military
commissions, largely insulating the tribunal that the lawyers opposed and
ultimately resulting in their client's conviction by that tribunal. In sum,
Hamdan's lawyers laid the foundation for the Military Commissions Act.
It is lawyers' ability to form the law, not merely parrot it, that makes law
a "public profession." '252 The lawyer's professional role preserves the status quo
in the face of "any attempted domination of the legal apparatus by executive
tyrants, populist mobs, or powerful private factions.""2 3 But lawyers can also
repair defects in the framework of legality, serve as a policy intelligentsia,
recommending improvements in the law to adapt it to changing con-
ditions, and use the authority and influence deriving from.., public
prominence and professional skill to create and disseminate, both within
249. This role is virtually ignored by the Model Rules, which make only one reference to such
a role. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) ("Lawyers play a vital role in the preserva-
tion of society.").
250. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948-950 (West 2008).
251. See Katyal, supra note 151, at 95.
252. During the American revolutionary period, lawyers were seen as a "separate estate of society,
committed by professional instincts and habits to serving as a balance wheel in political life." Robert W.
Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988). For further support of this historical
point see Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America's Governing Class: The Fonnation and Dissolution of the
Orignal Undersutding of the American Lawyer's Role, 8 U. CHI. L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 (2001), and
Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
241 (1992). David Luban similarly writes: "Historically, an independent bar, like an active and free
press, has often formed an important counterweight to arbitrary authority." LUBAN, supra note 234, at
5. But see Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War: Poliucs and Professionalism During
the Civil War and Reconswuction, 46 WM. & MARY L REv. 2001 (2005) (disputing Gordon's historical
claims and arguing that the zealous advocacy model was quite strong during the antebellum period).
253. Gordon, supra note 252, at 14.
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and without the context of advising clients, a culture of respect for and
compliance with the purposes of the laws.254
This dynamic understanding of the lawyer's relationship to law and society
means that there is a lot at stake in the decisions lawyers make in the course
of representing their clients. 5
The difficulty in conceiving of the lawyer as social architect is that in
our pluralist society, we disagree about what good institutions should look
like. The lawyer looking to fulfill his obligation to justice faces the problem
of defining what justice is. It may be impossible to say that a particular legal
rule or institution is in the "public interest" because the concept is so thor-
oughly contested.256 Some argue that precisely because we are a pluralist, secular
society we need a common language of shared legal norms to foster agreement.
For example, Robert Gordon writes that "[o]ne function of lawyers,.., in
addition to pursuing their client's interests[,] is to give advice that will help
align those interests with the set of general social norms."2 7 I would go a step
further and argue that the function of lawyers, who are engaged in the
building-up of legal institutions, is to build them in ways that are consistent
with aspirational legal norms.
Unfortunately, the general obligation to advance justice does not solve
the dilemma for lawyers facing the unjust tribunal because it is unclear which
tactics will be most likely to advance the cause of justice. As Part I demon-
strated, sometimes acts of resistance intended to advance justice will render
the lawyer complicit in injustice, and similarly sometimes acts that appear
complicit will end up being powerful forms of resistance. Perhaps more trou-
bling, the obligation to pursue justice is difficult to fulfill because exactly what
constitutes procedural justice in any particular situation will likely remain
contested. That brings us to the critical issues for lawyers facing injustice:
What is procedural injustice? After all, without a definition of procedural jus-
tice, how can a lawyer know that a tribunal is in fact so unjust that resistance
is appropriate?
254. Id.
255. See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'
ETHICS (1998) (arguing in favor of a lawyer's duty to build just institutions); LUBAN, supra note 234
(same); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2003) (same); Russell G. Pearce, Professional Responsibility for the Age of Obama, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1595 (2009) (same).
256. See Austin Sarat, The Profession Versus the Public Interest: Reflections on Two Reifications, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1497 (2002) ("The public interest is a notoriously slippery concept that generally
does little or no analytic work.").
257. Gordon, supra note 252, at 17-18.
B. The Difficulty of Defining Procedural Injustice and the Parameters
of Disagreement
Thus far, the analysis has been concerned with how lawyers can react to
procedural injustice once they recognize it. Yet a more fundamental question
remains unanswered: What is procedural injustice? As mentioned, developing
a complete theory of procedural justice is beyond the scope of this Article.21 8 It
is also evident that there is no available theory of procedural justice that gar-
ners widespread agreement. The lack of such a theory of procedural justice to
guide lawyer action has serious implications. If there is no measure of injus-
tice that we can all agree on in application, then it is up to individual lawyers
to make their own determinations. As a result, the best that can be said is
that lawyers are in a position to judge what constitutes injustice.
Our system indeed leaves it to individual lawyers to decide when injustice
is present in a tribunal such that some form of resistance is warranted. This
autonomy is the product both of the traditional freedom of lawyers to choose
their clients and of our pluralist society in which there is disagreement about
justice in application, if not in principle."9 It would be easy if lawyers could
simply lay the question of justice at the client's door. But deferring to client
goals is insufficient because lawyers do have agency and their actions in response
to a tribunal have the potential to support or prevent injustice, to resist or be
complicit.
Most everyone would agree that some tribunals violate the basic princi-
ples of procedural justice. Yet even if we agree on basic principles, they are
contested in practice. The lack of agreement poses a problem for justifying
resistance to a tribunal. If the tribunals are vindicated and judged to be fair
retrospectively, lawyer resistance may be seen as a betrayal. On the other hand,
not resisting may signal that an unfair tribunal is just because the adver-
sarial system lends that tribunal the appearance of justice.
Some basic principles of procedural justice are generally agreed upon in
our society. Fundamental to procedural justice is that the tribunal should
258. The difficulty of identifying procedural injustice is further complicated by the presence
of substantive injustice. In this Article, I am concerned with situations in which injustice in the
proceedings before the tribunal is at issue, while recognizing that procedural injustice is often linked
with substantive injustice, and that the distinction between the two is oftentimes difficult to draw. Cf.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing
between substance and procedure for Erie purposes).
259. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 251 (2004) (argu-
ing in the context of civil litigation that a theory of procedural justice based on moral theories will
never get widespread agreement).
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"hear the other side.'2'6 From this principle arguably flow the requirements
that the decisionmaker be impartial;2 61 the procedures for trial and the ele-
ments of the crime be established in advance;2 62 and the accused be permitted
access to the adverse evidence and an opportunity to rebut that evidence.2 63
These principles could be derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment (which, even if held to apply to a given case, does not tell us
how much process is due),2" from the more fixed provisions of the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights providing for procedural protections in
criminal trials,265 or from international law.266
260. See Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549, 558 (1958) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) ("Audi
alteram partem-hear the other side!-a demand made insistently through the centuries, is now a
command, spoken with the voice of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, against
state governments, and every branch of them-executive, legislative, and judicial, whenever any
individual, however lowly and unfortunate, asserts a legal claim."). For a philosophical discussion of
this maxim, see Luban, supra note 8, at 1984-85 (describing the work of the philosopher Stuart
Hampshire).
261. "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias
his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 131 (James
Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986) (arguing that
the most basic due process requirement is an unbiased judge).
262. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39, 46-81 (1964). Fuller articulated eight
requirements for the rule of law to be achieved: rules must (1) be general rules, rather than ad hoc deci-
sions; (2) be promulgated and publicized; (3) be prospective, rather than retroactive; (4) be clear and
understandable; (5) not be contradictory; (6) not command the impossible; and (7) not be changed too
frequently; and (8) there must exist a congruence between the rules and their actual administration. Id.
263. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624, 634 n.67 (2006) (citing cases holding that the
right of the accused to know and dispute adverse evidence is fundamental).
264. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall. .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; ...."). One question before the military commissions was whether the
Fifth Amendment would apply in these tribunals. The military commission judge held that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to the commission proceedings in Hamdan's trial. See infra note 283.
265. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (holding that the due process calculus
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), does not apply in the criminal context);
Martinez, supra note 204, at 1048. For specific provisions that might be applicable, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9 (prohibiting ex post facto laws); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing for trial by jury in all
criminal cases); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (procedural requirements for crime of treason); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (requiring indictment by a Grand jury for capital crimes, prohibiting double jeopardy, and
providing for a right against self-incrimination); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing for the right to a
speedy trial; by impartial jury; to know the accusations in advance; to confront witnesses; and for the
assistance of counsel).
266. In the context of the military commissions, some have argued that the principles described in
the text are embodied in the Geneva Convention requirement that individuals be provided 'all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."' Hamdan, 548 U.S. at
633 (quoting Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949). The United States is not a signatory to
this Protocol, but recognizes it as a part of international customary law. Martinez, supra note 204, at
1057-58. In Iamdan, the Court stated that the rights under the Protocol include the right to be tried
in one's presence and to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance. 548 U.S. at 633 n.66;
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In the application of these principles, however, disagreement
surfaces-proving Justice Holmes's well-worn maxim that general propositions
do not decide concrete cases.267 For example, we cannot agree on whether
some procedural requirements are absolute or whether (and when) they may
be weighed against other considerations, such as national security or effi-
ciency.2'6 This is especially true in cases implicating our concept of due process.
As Justice Frankfurter famously explained, due process "is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."269
Due process is instead a malleable concept that can accommodate very broad or
very minimal procedural protections.
Hiamdan v. Rumsfeld27" illustrates the contested nature of procedural jus-
tice. The fact that there were six opinions in the case demonstrates this point.
Some of the justices disagreed on the basic question of whether structural
indicia of bias rendered broad judicial discretion unjust.27' One of the issues
raised by the defendant's lawyers was that the accused could be excluded from
his trial, and had in fact already been excluded from voir dire. The plurality
opinion called the right to be present at one's trial "one of the most
fundamental protections," and stated that "the jettisoning of so basic a right
cannot lightly be excused as 'practicable."'272 In his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy conceded that the provision of the Executive Order creating the
military commissions that permitted the accused to be excluded from his
trial was "troubling, 273 but he found solace in the provisions of the military
commission regulations that "bar the presiding officer from admitting secret
evidence if doing so would deprive the accused of a 'full and fair trial."'274
see also David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure? Identifying the International Law Regulating
Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT'L L.J. 55 (2006).
267. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes
exempted from this general proposition "fundamental principles as they have been understood by the
traditions of our people and our law" when the violation meets with "universal condemnation." Id.
Condemnation of the tribunals in the case studies presented here was not universal, although today it
is arguably widespread.
268. For example, in Hamdi v. Runsfeld, 452 U.S. 507 (2004), members of the Court disagreed
over whether the Mathews due process calculus applies to citizens detained as part of the "War on
Terror," id. at 531, or whether there were fundamental constitutional guarantees that were not
amenable to such balancing. Id. at 576 (Scalia, ]., dissenting).
269. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
270. 548 U.S. 557.
271. Compare id. at 624, with id. at 654 (Kennedy, )., concurring).
272. Id. at 624 (majority opinion).
273. Id. at 654 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
274. Id. While trusting the judge's discretion, Justice Kennedy recognized that the structure of
the military commission process created concerns that this same decisionmaker would not be neutral.
Id. at 648-50.
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The disagreement between the plurality and Justice Kennedy demonstrates
the extent to which even the right of the defendant to be present at his trial,
usually considered fundamental to procedural justice, is contested in application.
Disagreement over the fairness of the military commissions' procedures
was further reflected in the arguments of participants and observers. While
many, including some prosecutors, deplored the commissions as unfair, others
took the opposite view. Bush Administration and Department of Defense
Officials, prosecutors in the military commission system, and the presiding
authority often affirmed their commitment to providing full and fair trials,
and insisted that the procedures they created were fair. 7 As Army Colonel
Robert L. Swann, the commissions' Chief Prosecutor, stated: "More than
anyone in the courtroom, I want a full and fair process. If there is a case on
appeal, I want it sustained on appeal." '276
Hamdan's lawyers framed his case in terms of separation of powers and
the correct processes for convening military commissions rather than in terms
of fundamental rights, precisely because of the difficulty of achieving agree-
ment on what procedural justice requires. 7  This framing was controversial.
As one of the litigators on the case, Neil Katyal, explained: "Many organiza-
tions did not like this approach and wanted me to argue that the military
commissions were unconstitutional. But such claims seemed quite prema-
ture."278 The Supreme Court itself dodged the issue of the commissions'
procedural fairness entirely. On the one hand, it encouraged the executive to
return to Congress to explicitly authorize the military commissions,279 which
Congress immediately did, but on the other set no constraints on those com-
missions once ratified by Congress."
Even the federal judge considering the issue of procedural justice in
Hamdan's case admitted his inability to make definitive rulings on the subject.
In July 2008, days before he was set to be tried by military commission, Salim
275. See generally Borch, supra note 38; ROTUNDA, supra note 38.
276. Scott Higham, Hearings Open With Challenges to Tribunals, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004,
at A12 (quoting Army Colonel Robert L. Swann) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277. See Martinez, supra note 204, at 157-58.
278. Katyal, supra note 151, at 95.
279. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Nothing prevents the President
from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.").
280. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 948-950 (West 2008). Similarly,
the Justices disagreed widely about whether a citizen detained as part of the "War on Terror" was
entitled to a hearing, and what that hearing should require. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004). Likewise, when the Court held that noncitizen detainees are entitled to habeas corpus rights in
Bouwediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), it gave little guidance about what would inevitably be the
subject of those habeas petitions: what procedural protections ought to apply to the Combat Status
Review Tribunals at issue in that case.
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Hamdan appealed to the D.C. District Court to stay his trial and to deter-
mine whether the commissions' procedures comported with due process."'
The Court declined to hear the case, pointing to Hamdan's right to appeal after
his trial by military commission had been completed.282 The Court recog-
nized that judges might differ on the requirements of procedural justice and
left the determination to the appellate process.283
Another point bears mentioning. To the D.C. District Court, the
appearance of justice was as important as the fact of procedural justice. As
the judge explained: "The eyes of the world are on Guantdnamo Bay. Justice
must be done there, and must be seen to be done there, fairly and impar-
tially."2" The statement could be taken to mean simply that a public trial,
rather than a secret one, was critical to procedural justice. Or the judge could
have meant that the appearance of procedural justice is equally important as a
just outcome. The latter implication is consistent with social-psychological
studies showing that processes perceived to be fair improve perceptions of
unjust outcomes. 285
The psychological and sociological emphasis on the appearance of jus-
tice underscores the importance of the lawyers' decision to resist in the first
place, as well as the lawyer's choice of strategy for that resistance. Particularly
in moments when procedural justice is heavily contested and when the winds
of public opinion might sway in different directions, the lawyer's actions play
an important role. Social psychological studies demonstrate that Americans
perceive adversarial proceedings to be more fair than other types of proc-
esses. While there is a risk that people may attach too much importance to
procedures and that procedures may distract from unjust outcomes, there is also
the concern that certain procedures may falsely signal procedural justice that
is in fact absent.87 Adversarial adjudication is one of the signposts of our
collective conception of procedural justice, even if it is only perceived as a
necessary but not sufficient condition. This perception of the fairness of adver-
sarial procedures increases the responsibility of lawyers, whose participation
281. See Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2008).
282. Id.
283. See id. In Hamdan's trial, the military commission judge held that the Fifth Amendment
did not apply to the commission proceedings, but did exclude some evidence he found was obtained
by coercion. Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Coercive Interrogation Practices
(D-029) and Ruling on Motion to Suppress Statements Based on Fifth Amendment (D-044), U.S. v.
Hamdan (U.S. Military Comm'n July 20, 2008).
284. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 137.
285. See TYLER, supra note 91, at 79-80.
286. Id.
287. See id. at 80.
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is part of the presentation of justice being seen to be done. Therefore, the
decisions of the lawyer to participate or to withdraw, with their concurrent
risks of complicity, will alter the outcome of the debate about procedural
justice. The lawyer's complicity may justify an unjust system, while successful
resistance may spur recognition of the tribunal's injustice.
That the appearance of adversarialism can be a misleading indicator of
fairness was noted by Justice Rutledge in In re Yamashita." The case concerned
a Japanese General tried by a military commission on the field of battle in
the Philippines in 1945 for failing to prevent terrible atrocities committed by the
Japanese Army. Yamashita applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus, and the Court denied the petition. Writing about the lawyers who
represented Yamashita, Justice Rutledge explained:
One basic protection of our system and one only, petitioner has had. He
has been represented by able counsel, officers of the army he fought.
Their difficult assignment has been done with extraordinary fidelity, not
only to the accused, but to their high conception of military justice,
always to be administered in subordination to the Constitution and
consistent Acts of Congress and treaties. But, as will appear, even
this conceded shield was taken away in much of its value, by denial
of reasonable opportunity for them to perform their function 89
In cases of procedurally unjust tribunals, the adversarial system breaks down.
The fact that a client is zealously represented does not in and of itself make a
system just. Nevertheless, lawyer resistance can, in some circumstances, bend
the trajectory of an unjust system towards justice.
C. Lawyer Choices and the Dynamism of Procedural Change
Because procedural justice is contested, lawyers' choices matter.
Procedural rules, like any rules, are dynamic; they change over time. Change
can be slow, such as when a set of rules that appear procedurally unjust are
reinterpreted over time to become more just. Or change can be rapid, such
as when a procedural rule is repealed, or when a court holds that a particular
rule violates due process. For example, the battle over what rights detainees
in Guantdnamo Bay are entitled to, and what procedural protections military
tribunals ought to offer, has been ongoing for nearly eight years. President
Obama's decision to close the military commissions, if he follows through
with it, would end this particular debate once and for all.
288. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
289. Id. at 45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, change is not a one-way ratchet. Procedural regimes can
change for the better or for the worse. Lawyer actions are part of this process
of procedural change and may increase or decrease injustice. Richard Abel
and David Dyzenhaus have both shown that litigation strategies in apartheid
South Africa had a positive, if not always entirely successful, effect of miti-
gating injustice.290 By contrast, Richard Weisberg has demonstrated how the
interpretive strategies of lawyers in Vichy France increased injustice and enabled
the persecution of Jews."'
The dynamism of procedural regimes affects the choices available to law-
yers who attempt to advance justice in unjust proceedings. The particular
quality of dynamism within a legal system depends in part on the surrounding
political system. The procedurally unjust tribunal within an otherwise liberal
legal regime, such as the Guantdnamo military commissions or state courts in
the Jim Crow South, presents different opportunities for lawyers than do totali-
tarian legal regimes. Lawyers in a totalitarian regime must draw on principles
external to the regime in arguing for justice. By contrast, lawyers litigating in
the context of a liberal democracy may access domestic legal norms to make
their case.
This access may be jurisdictional, or it may invoke substantive ideals.
Lawyers representing SCLC leaders against criminal contempt charges, and
lawyers filing habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Guantinamo detainees,
sought and received federal court review of the unjust systems they faced.292
For them, access to justice was jurisdictional. Lawyers for the Guantdnamo
detainees also attempted to import substantive ideals into the military commis-
sions trials. For example, Joshua Dratel used the NACDL ethics opinion to
negotiate with the commissions' appointing authority to alleviate some of
the burdens the government imposed on the attorney-client relationship.
The ethics rules enabled Dratel to import constitutional and other principles
of legal liberalism into the military commissions.
The particular quality of dynamism also depends on the judges presiding
over unjust tribunals. What lawyers think judges will do is one of the primary
motivators for lawyer action, and will influence the lawyers' choice of tactics
for resistance. For example, a lawyer who believes a judge is a strict positivist
may try to organize a collective boycott of the proceedings or may individually
290. See ABEL, supra note 8, at 549 (describing how legal battles against racially restrictive laws
"empowered the masses while offering some protection from state retaliation"); DYZENHAUS, supra
note 84 (arguing that the application of Ronald Dworkin's theory of law in South Africa enabled
judges to ameliorate racially restrictive laws).
291. See generally WEISBERG, supra note 8.
292. See supra Part I.A.1 and I.B.2.
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refuse to participate. By contrast, a lawyer who believes a judge will be will-
ing to access principles and values from the broader liberal legal system may
think it possible to persuade the judge to rule fairly. But lawyers' predictions
of judicial response alone do not dictate the strategy they adopt; the choice of
strategy will also be influenced by the lawyer's goals. 93 For example, imagine
that a lawyer believes a judge is a strict positivist who will not access
fundamental principles from the larger legal regime. That lawyer may try to
organize a collective boycott of the proceedings or may individually refuse
to participate. Or the lawyer may nevertheless choose to participate in order
to make a record for a higher tribunal; bring pressure to bear through the
court of public opinion; or bear witness to injustice for some future proceed-
ing or for posterity. On the other hand, a lawyer who believes the judge is a
functionalist or otherwise open to legal principles may choose to participate
in order to effect a change in the law through the tribunal. When Dratel
negotiated with the convening authority to change the rules of the military
commissions, he was participating in the system because he believed he could
change it from within. By contrast, when Dratel refused to sign the notice of
appearance, he did so because he had failed to convince the presiding officer of
the necessity of fundamental rule of law principles.
Ultimately, the types of resistance lawyers engage in are a function of
lawyers' own optimism, which is in turn related to their theories of law. The
type of optimism that dictates engagement with an unjust tribunal is
expressed in Dr. King's words, although he was not a lawyer: "Not every judge
will issue an injunction; we can't assume that."'294 This optimism is based in
part on faith that fundamental principles exist and may be accessed, and in part
on faith in the ability of judges to do justice even within the unjust tribu-
nal.295 Lawyers who hold theories of law closer to the natural law tradition
will have an easier time arguing that certain fundamental principles should
293. How the lawyer adopts these goals is an important question. The legal profession literature
often makes the distinction between the "cause" and the client. See generally AUSTIN SARAT,
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1988);
William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers
in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623 (1997). As a descriptive matter, the lawyer may
develop goals in conjunction with the client or on his own, depending on the nature of the lawyer's
relationship with the client.
294. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 15, at 62.
295. What theories of law are or ought to be adopted by judges to best promote justice is beyond
the scope of this Article, although there are many fine book-length studies of the question. See, e.g.,
COVER, supra note 13 (analyzing the jurisprudence of judges in decisions regarding the Fugitive Slave
Act); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (presenting a complete theory of judging justly);
DYZENHAUS, supra note 84 (presenting a sophisticated application of Dworkin's theory of judging to the
South African context).
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be imported into the unjust tribunal than will lawyers closer to the positivist
school. 96 Similarly, lawyers' views on the proper role of the judiciary will
have an impact on their tactics and their decisions to invoke different types
of legal arguments. For example, as discussed, in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld29
litigation Neil Katyal decided to raise separation of powers arguments against
the military commissions, rather than those based on fundamental rights.298
This decision was likely influenced by Katyal's strongly held jurisprudential
views about judicial minimalism.2" The lawyers' decisions in that case raise a
question of what limitations a lawyer's jurisprudential views can place on the
representation.3" Katyal's decision to make a separation of powers argument
opened the door to legislative action but did not encourage the Court to give
Congress any guidance as to what type tribunal would impermissibly violate
fundamental rights. The result was congressional ratification of the military
commissions. 01 Whether this particular tactic was the best course of action
for the client, the legal system, and society is an open question. The lawyers'
tactics shaped the law and the possibilities for procedural justice going for-
ward, demonstrating the central role of lawyers' decisions-including the
forms of lawyer resistance-in shaping the direction of the law.
CONCLUSION
American lawyers facing unjust tribunals have most commonly chosen to
participate with an eye toward appeal to a higher tribunal, or they have
refused to participate on an individual basis. For example, lawyers representing
Salim Hamdan and those representing Martin Luther King Jr. all chose to
engage with the tribunals in order to reach the federal courts, where they
hoped to obtain a fair hearing for their respective clients. Other lawyers,
including prosecutors, have either refused to participate or have withdrawn
from representing clients before the military commissions because they believed
296. The debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart regarding the concept of law, in particu-
lar with respect to the Nazi regime, sheds some light on these differences. For a very useful discussion
of Fuller's theory in the context of lawyering, see LUBAN, supra note 234, at 99-130. See also H.L.A.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958); Fuller, supra note
128.
297. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
298. See Kayal, supra note 151.
299. Id.
300. Another way of thinking about this is that Katyal's decision calls into question the separa-
tion between the goals of the representation, which are supposed to be controlled by the client, and the
strategies adopted to achieve those goals, which are ordinarily assumed to be controlled by the lawyer.
301. See Harrdan, 548 U.S. 557.
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the commissions to be unfair." 2 But these decisions have spurred little public
debate about the role lawyers ought to play with respect to these tribunals. It is
worthwhile to reflect on the assumptions behind these choices, and what they
say about law, our legal culture, and the legal professional.
Lawyers who have participated in the military commissions worried about
the effects of participation. Some were "concerned[ ] that fighting would serve
to validate the system."3 3 But at the same time, as this analysis has attempted to
demonstrate, their strategy-to attack the system head on-has also had its
share of complications. Lawyers who resist injustice by attacking a sham system
are not guaranteed absolution of responsibility for injustice. Neither are lawyers
who refuse to participate absolved by keeping their hands clean while letting
others get theirs dirty. Many lawyers facing procedural injustice have adopted
risky and brave strategies of resistance. 4 Often, these are the lawyers we hear
about in the media. Others have pursued silent but equally powerful acts of
resistance. All these decisions have their pitfalls, and none offer moral purity.
This Article has considered the dilemma and the strategic options for
lawyers facing unjust tribunals. It has shown the difficulty of identifying
injustice, and has analyzed the complex set of choices lawyers have when
confronted by this injustice. What is most surprising is not the diversity of
approaches to injustice, nor the difficulty of the problems it poses for lawyers
who want to represent their clients and uphold the rule of law. Rather, most
surprising is the fact that the bar has barely engaged in a discussion of which
approaches are best for our democracy. This conversation is critical because
of the lawyer's special role as a "builder-up" of legal systems.
The portraits of resistance presented here do not represent the first time,
nor the last, that the American legal system has been accused of injustice. The
resistance that the military commission system has spurred in the legal commu-
nity offers an opportunity to explore the strategies of resistance lawyers
adopt in the face of injustice and the interplay of resistance and complicity in
the context of representation. This Article is just the beginning of such an
exploration. Many questions remain: Is it possible to agree on the minimum
requirements of procedural justice to guide lawyers in choosing resistance? Is
resistance as appropriate in cases of isolated injustice as it is in cases of
systemic injustice? Does lawyer participation actually legitimate or lend credibil-
ity to injustice as an empirical matter? Which forms of resistance (if any) are
302. See supra note 136 (discussing the withdrawal of Morris Davis).
303. William Glaberson, An Unlikely Antagonist in the Detainees' Comer, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
2008, at Al (quoting Charles Swift, former detailed military counsel for Salim Hamdan).
304. See generally Luban, supra note 8 (describing heroic efforts of lawyers before the military
commissions).
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most compatible with the lawyer's responsibility to the rule of law, to legal
institutions, and to the client? This analysis therefore calls for further em-
pirical study of how lawyers in real situations think about and respond to
injustice, and for an evaluation of their justifications for these responses.

